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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Something is rotten, but contrary to Marcellus’s suggestion to 
Horatio, it’s not in Denmark.”
1
  Deposition practice, in Kansas and 
elsewhere, plays an important role that generally facilitates early and 
less-expensive resolution of disputes.
2
  As one of the most essential 
elements of discovery, depositions are intended to enable the free flow of 
information between the parties.
3
  The reality that more than ninety 
percent of civil cases filed in both federal and state courts are resolved 
outside the courtroom highlights the tremendous importance that fact-
finding depositions serve.
4
  This not-so-new reality is the fuel that fires 
many discovery disputes and hampers the flow of information––“now 
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 1.  Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 596 (N.D. Iowa 
2014), rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 
944–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district court failed to give sufficient notice of unusual 
sanction). 
 2.  DAVID MALONE & PETER HOFFMAN, THE EFFECTIVE DEPOSITION: TECHNIQUES AND 
STRATEGIES THAT WORK xxiii––xxiv (4th ed. 2012). 
 3.  See Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. at 596. 
 4.  See GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 185 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (citing Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts: 2006, Table C-4A). 
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too often mired in obstructionism [in depositions].”
5
  Whatever the 
reason, whether to grandstand for a client or to win the litigation war, 
obstructionist litigators’ warped view of zealous advocacy only serves to 
deny “the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding.”
6
  As the old saying goes: the wheels of justice turn 




Most litigators conduct depositions in a professional and courteous 
demeanor.  A chosen few, however, select a different route.  Like “Ivan 
Pavlov’s dogs,” these practitioners salivate at any opportunity to impede 
the flow of information in depositions.
8
  Some are rewarded by a 
judiciary that too often ignores this conduct.
9
  As the tide shifts, however, 
obstructionist attorneys are exposed to a judiciary that appears to be fed 
up with the present state of deposition practice and with less hesitation to 
impose more severe sanctions.  That is not to say that all jurisdictions are 
plagued with obstructionist behavior around every bend; to the contrary, 
many jurisdictions offer little case law guidance, particularly Kansas.  
However, a close examination of the federal and state procedural rules,
10
 
the local federal practice guidelines,
11
 and the rules of professional 
conduct
12
 provide instruction on how to conduct oneself when taking—or 
defending—any deposition. 
The purpose of this Article is to provide guidance for litigators who 
conduct depositions, both by informing the reader what type of behavior 
is allowed under the rules and what constitutes sanctionable conduct.  
Although this Article may be particularly useful for attorneys practicing 
in Kansas state and federal courts, the conclusions drawn are relevant in 
any jurisdiction.  In Part II.A., we briefly discuss the implications of 
vexatious scheduling tactics and how schemes to delay or manipulate the 
calendaring of depositions impedes the overall discovery timeline and 
frustrates a party’s access to testimony from either the opposing party or 
other  key witnesses in a civil case.  Second, in Part II.B., this Article 
                                                          
 5.  See Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. at 596–97. 
 6.  Id. at 596–97 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 7.  Id. at 597. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. 
 10.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30, 32. 
 11.  Deposition Guidelines, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. OF KAN., 
http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/deposition-guidelines/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2016) [hereinafter 
Deposition Guidelines]. 
 12.  See infra Part II.F. 
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analyzes numerous forms of obstreperous behavior and suggests how 
opposing counsel should respond.  Additionally, this part considers the 
negative consequences such behavior can have on a practitioner’s 
reputation and career.  Third, in Part II.C., this Article closely examines 
forms of on-the-record witness coaching, speaking objections, and 
instructions not to answer.  This part also discusses the “form” objection 
controversy and how to properly lodge such an objection in the District 
of Kansas.  Fourth, in Part II.D., this Article contrasts proper forms of 
private conferences during depositions with improper off-the-record 
witness coaching.  Fifth, in Part II.E., this Article highlights the need to 
remain vigilant post-deposition by studying the improper use of errata 
sheets to change material deposition testimony.  Sixth, in Part II.F., we 
briefly discuss a court’s power to sanction discovery misconduct under 
federal and state procedural rules, and the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct that are implicated when a lawyer engages in gamesmanship 
tactics or misconduct that crosses ethical boundaries.  Finally, in Part III, 
we offer a brief conclusion. 
II. ANALYSIS 
In delving into our discussion of the various forms of inappropriate 
behavior and questionable tactics that are the hallmark of misconduct in 
deposition practice, we attempt to analyze these matters through the lens 
of Kansas practice—both in the federal district court and Kansas state 
court.  Thus, we analyze and interpret the pertinent Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the United States District of Kansas local practice 
rules and Deposition Guidelines.  Also, we use case law to help us 
interpret federal procedural rules and guidelines when it is appropriate 
and available to do so.  With regard to Kansas state practice, to the extent 
the procedural rules are different and there is available interpretive case 
law, we try to highlight those differences too.  Lastly, legal ethics, which 
include the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct and the Kansas Pillars 
of Professionalism, play an important role in how all lawyers licensed in 
Kansas and practicing in either federal or state court should conduct 
themselves in discovery practice.  So, to the extent ethical rules or the 
professionalism code is implicated in our discussion, we attempt to bring 
attention to them as well. 
A. Vexatious Scheduling 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide little guidance on the 
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process of how parties should schedule depositions.  Federal Rule 30(b) 
states that “[a] party who wants to depose a person . . . must give 
reasonable written notice to every other party.”
13
  However, this rule 
does not define what is meant by “reasonable written notice,” nor does it 
suggest that the parties should discuss and coordinate scheduling matters 
so as to avoid any misunderstanding or conflict.
14
  Since Federal Rule 
26(f)(1) states that the “parties must confer as soon as practicable” to 
conduct a discovery conference and draft a proposed scheduling order, 
arguably this “meet and greet” with lawyers should be used by the parties 
to discuss deposition practice, including discussing the witnesses who 
will be deposed and the timing of when the depositions are likely to 
occur in the discovery phase of the case.
15
 
The District of Kansas Local Rule 30.1 and the federal court’s 
Deposition Guidelines are both helpful, and yet somewhat inconsistent, 
in defining what is meant by “reasonable written notice” to be given for a 
deposition under Federal Rule 30(b).
16
  For example, Local Rule 30.1, 
explicitly provides that “reasonable notice provided by Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 
30(b)(1) for the taking of depositions is 7 days.”
17
  This local rule further 
states that “[f]or good cause, the court may enlarge or shorten such 
time.”
18
  But note, the Deposition Guidelines, at paragraph three, 
provide: 
[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, counsel shall consult in advance 
with opposing counsel and proposed deponents in an effort to schedule 
depositions at mutually convenient times and places.  That counsel for 
a party may be unavailable shall not, however, be grounds for 
postponing a deposition if another attorney of record for that party is 
able to attend. Unless leave of court or agreement of counsel is first 




Whether “reasonable written notice” for the taking of a deposition is 
seven days or five days, the Federal Rules relating to discovery and the 
Deposition Guidelines both require counsel to confer as soon as 
                                                          
 13.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1). 
 14.  See generally A. Darby Dickerson, Deposition Dilemmas: Vexatious Scheduling and 
Errata Sheets, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1998).  
 15.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 16.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(1). 
 17.  D. KAN.  R. § 30.1 [hereinafter Local Rule § 30.1]. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 3 (emphasis added). 
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practicable about the scheduling of depositions for a case.  Importantly, 
Local Rule 30.1 clearly provides that the seven-day window can be 




Another notable condition to scheduling depositions under the 
Federal Rules is that, under Federal Rule 30(d)(1), “a deposition is 
limited to 1 day of 7 hours,” unless the parties agree or the court orders 
otherwise.
21
  Further this provision of Federal Rule 30 provides that the 
court “must allow additional time consistent with Rule 26(b)(1) and (2) if 
needed to fairly examine the deponent or if the deponent, another person, 
or any other circumstance impedes or delays the examination.”
22
 
These instructions about how “reasonable written notice” is achieved 
under Federal Rule 30(b) and the time limitations under Federal Rule 
30(d)(1) should be beneficial to avoid conflicts that arise in scheduling or 
rescheduling of depositions.  One of the few cases in the federal courts 
addressing the issue of vexatious scheduling of depositions arose in the 
District of Kansas in 1997, well before the Deposition Guidelines were 
promulgated by the district court.  In Oleson v. Kmart Corp.,
23
 the 
defendant’s counsel, Mr. Haynes, engaged in what the court described as 
“discourteous, disruptive and unprofessional” conduct in defending the 
depositions taken of his client’s four employees.
24
  During the deposition 
of one employee, Mr. Haynes repeatedly instructed the deponent-
employee “not to answer questions to which no privilege was asserted,” 
he “argued objections,” and he interrupted deposing counsel numerous 
times.
25
  When a second deposition of another employee on the same day 
got delayed well into the evening due mostly to Mr. Haynes’s 
“unprofessional and unacceptable” conduct in the first deposition, 
deposing counsel asked that the second deposition be rescheduled.
26
  Mr. 
Haynes refused this request.
27
  In yet another deposition of defendant’s 
employee taken later in the case, Mr. Haynes failed to timely turn over 
documents before the deposition, which had been properly requested by 
                                                          
 20.  Local Rule § 30.1, supra note 17. 
 21.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Oleson v. Kmart Corp., 175 F.R.D. 570 (D. Kan. 1997). 
 24.  Id. at 573. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id.  




  Then, when deposing counsel requested to recess 
the deposition because of inclement weather and because of Mr. 
Haynes’s failure to produce documents needed for the deposition, Mr. 
Haynes refused.
29
  Frustrated with Mr. Haynes’s overall conduct in the 
deposition, the district court imposed monetary sanctions directly upon 
him.
30
  Further, in referring to a deposition of an employee that would 
have started at 7:00 p.m. due to Mr. Haynes’s misconduct, the court 
intimated that a deposition occurring after “normal business hours” 
would need the prior agreement of the parties to proceed.
31
 
The Kansas state deposition rule, found at section 60-230(b) of the 
Kansas state code, mirrors the federal rule with regard to the “reasonable 
written notice” language in scheduling depositions.
32
  However, unlike 
the local federal rule that defines “reasonable written notice” to mean 
seven days, there is no counterpart in the state procedural rules.  Further, 
unlike Federal Rule 30(d)(1), Kansas law does not have a time limit for a 
deposition to be completed, nor is there any statutory mandate that a 
discovery conference be held between the parties and their counsel to 
plan discovery or discuss deposition practice.
33
  In fact, because there is 
not a discreet discovery period under the state procedural rules, a 
deposition can be scheduled at any time after the Petition—the initial 
pleading—has been filed.  Presumably, in the state system, a deposition 
can continue from day to day until it is completed.  Finally, and 
significantly, there is no state counterpart to the federal district court’s 
Deposition Guidelines, so state practitioners may be left to muddle 
through difficult or vexatious deposition scheduling tactics with much 
less guidance than is provided by the local federal district court. 
B. Incivility 
Too often counsel forget––or choose to ignore––that depositions are 
part of judicial proceedings and “not a playground or a boxing ring 
                                                          
 28.  Id. at 574. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. at 573–74.  See also Picard v. Guilford House, LLC, No. 03106016061, 2014 WL 
1876595, at *4 (Conn. Sup. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) (lawyer sanctioned for not telling opposing counsel 
that she only had the deposition venue reserved until 3:15 PM and then not being agreeable to re-
scheduling the deposition after this was discovered). 
 32.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(b)(1) (Supp. 2015). 
 33.  See id.; see also Local Rule § 30.1, supra note 17. 
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where one feels out his opponent.”
34
  Because depositions are outside the 
immediate control of the judge, they can present a breeding ground for 
incivility and quickly deteriorate the purpose of any deposition: 
obtaining clear, truthful answers of the witnesses within the scope of 
discovery.
35
  Behavior of this sort hampers evidence collection and 
delays the judicial process.  Incivility is not directly addressed in the 
Federal Rules, however an implicit component of Federal Rule 30 
requires counsel to cooperate and be courteous to each other and to 
deponents.
36
  Further, the District of Kansas Deposition Guidelines 
explicitly note that “[c]ounsel are expected to cooperate with, and be 
courteous to, each other and deponents.”
37
  Although the state of Kansas 
has not adopted deposition guidelines, the Kansas Rules of Professional 




The federal and state procedural rules and deposition guidelines 
provide useful instruction, however they are broad enough to leave some 
ambiguity towards defining when the “incivility line” is breached.  Often 
the very judge who reviews the deposition transcript may not be far 
removed from private practice and understands that “[t]here are times 
when comments and actions of counsel defending [or taking] a 
deposition, although technically inconsistent with the strict principles,” 
can be helpful towards protecting the interests of their clients.
39
  
Unfortunately, at both the federal and state levels, Kansas case law 
provides minimal guidance for practitioners when it comes to examples 
of incivility.  A review of sanctionable conduct outside of Kansas’s 
borders, however, shines some light on the type of conduct the Kansas 
courts should aim to discourage.  The judicial tide is shifting, it seems, 




                                                          
 34.  Heriaud v. Ryder Transp. Servs., No. 030289, 2005 WL 2230199, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 8, 
2005). 
 35.  Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075, 2012 WL 28071, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 2012). 
 36.  Ash Grove Cement Co. v. Wausau Ins. Co., No. 05-2339, 2007 WL 689576, at *3 (D. Kan. 
Mar. 1, 2007). 
 37.  See Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 1. 
 38.  KAN.  R. PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(d) (“[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . 
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice”); KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2 
(noting that the lawyer controls the means); KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.2 (requiring counsel to take 
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation); see infra Part II.F. 
 39.  See Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *6. 
 40.  See Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595–97 (N.D. Iowa 
2014) (describing deposition conduct as “rotten” and noting that by ignoring such conduct, judges 
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1. Discreet Incivility-Gamesmanship 
Stepping outside the strict principles of deposition rules to protect 
the interests of one’s client is tempered by an equally important 
instruction: “when . . . counsel complains that such conduct is 
obstructing the deposition, . . . counsel are obliged to retreat to the 
boundaries of the rules.”
41
  A useful deposition certainly requires 
preparation of working theories and testing those theories by employing 
a variety of questioning techniques.
42
  But deposition tactics that cross 
the line “between appropriately aggressive advocacy and unrestrained, 
pointless [gamesmanship]” will step outside the bounds of the rules.
43
  
Even strategies that may seem minor and non-sanctionable can result in a 
deposition transcript that proves otherwise.
44
  For instance, in Huggins v. 
Coatesville Area School District, counsel was sanctioned after candidly 
admitting that he purposefully referred to the fact witness as “Ms. 
Walker” rather than “Dr. Walker” in an effort to make her feel “uneasy” 
and to “get an edge on [his] advocacy.”
45
  Similarly, practitioners should 
avoid attempts to gain the upper hand by delving into clearly irrelevant 
and sensitive topics, hostile comments designed to bait the deponent, or 
commentary such as “I’m asking the questions.”
46
  Gamesmanship 
comes in many forms, including direct efforts to glean information from 
opposing counsel’s material.  In Leo v. Garmin International, Inc., pro se 
                                                          
“reinforce––even incentivize––obstructionist tactics”), rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of 
Sioux City, Iowa v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 944–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district 
court failed to give sufficient notice of unusual sanction). 
 41.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *6. 
 42.  MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 71–74, 133–51. 
 43.  Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 16, 2009). 
 44.  See Corsini v. U-Haul Int’l, 212 A.D.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (while not 
sanctionable, noting the harassing behavior prior to a deposition where plaintiff counsel followed 
“defense counsel about the hallways of the courthouse and into a courtroom, while he was on trial in 
an unrelated case”). 
 45.  Huggins, 2009 WL 2973044, at *3. 
 46.  See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 203 F.R.D. 624, 631 (D. Kan. 2001) (embracing 
guidance espoused in Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 
1995) (“Where the objection is to irrelevant or repetitious questions, and interrogating counsel 
persists in such questioning after objection, opposing counsel’s remedy lies in applying to the court 
for a protective order or sanctions . . . .”)); Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C., No. 
411-154, 2012 WL 6824150, at *5 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2012) (asking questions in regard to “highly 
personal and sensitive matters that have no bearing on the subject matter” of the litigation); Freeman 
v. Schointuck, 192 F.R.D. 187, 188–90 (D. Md. 2000) (“baiting the [expert] deponent by saying she 
was going to ‘get three strikes’ and be ‘out.’”); In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 785 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(criticizing attorney for “race baiting”). 
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plaintiff’s “assistant” improperly trained a video camera solely on 
opposing counsel.
47
  Furthermore, the video portrayed the assistant 
rifling through opposing counsel’s confidential notes during breaks.
48
  
District of Kansas magistrate judge O’Hara stopped short of dismissing 
the case entirely, but imposed economic sanctions and prohibited the use 
of the depositions at trial.
49
  Rather than coaching the witness via 
speaking objections, some litigators have resorted to writing discreet 
messages on legal pads,
50
 sending text messages to the deponent,
51
 and 
tapping the deponent’s feet under the table.
52
  The methods of discreet 
incivility employed by opposing counsel are only limited by the 
instigator’s imagination.  When attorneys encounter obstructionist 
behavior, it is important to build a record at the deposition, remind 
opposing counsel of the rules governing the deposition, and seek the 
court’s assistance if it continues.
53
 
Needlessly harsh or abusive commentary, directed at the deponent or 
opposing counsel, is also a common theme that the judiciary appears 
determined to stop.  In Paramount Communications v. QVC Network, 
when the defending attorney, the infamous and recently deceased Texas 
trial lawyer, Joe Jamail,
54
 referred to opposing counsel as an “asshole,” 
                                                          
 47.  Leo v. Garmin Int’l, Inc., No. 09-2139-KHV, 2010 WL 1418587, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 7, 
2010), rev’d in part, No. 09-2139-KHV, 2010 WL 1418586, at *6 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 2010) (adopting 
the report and recommendation except for the proposed sanction of prohibiting the use of the 
depositions at trial).  
 48.  Id. at *1. 
 49.  Id.  District Judge Vratil declined to accept the proposed sanction to preclude the use of the 
depositions, however this is likely not a result of the sanction being viewed as improper; rather, it 
appears that the sanction was not adopted because the non-offending party objected.  See Leo, 2010 
WL 1418586, at *6. 
 50.  Tucker v. Pac. Bell Mobile Servs., 186 Cal. App. 4th 1548, 1551–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010).  
Although the court merely imposed monetary sanctions and required a different attorney to attend 
the re-deposition, such behavior would likely draw a more severe sanction in Kansas––primarily 
because the legal pad was purposefully destroyed after opposing counsel submitted a request to 
preserve it.  Id.  
 51.  Ngai v. Old Navy, No. 07-5653, 2009 WL 2391282, at *1–6 (D.N.J. July 31, 2009) 
(concluding that the text messages sent during the deposition were not protected by attorney client 
privilege, and ordering that copies be submitted to Plaintiff). 
 52.  Halmos v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., No. 08-10084, 2011 WL 1655597, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 2, 
2011). 
 53.  MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 268–73.  
 54.  Joe Jamail gained much of his notoriety when he won the “largest court [judgment] in 
history, $10.53 billion, representing oil giant Pennzoil against rival Texaco” in 1985.  He was often 
referred to as the “King of Torts” and was “widely known for his sharp tongue and brash style.”  
However, his deposition antics have been held out as examples of what not to do.  Joe Palazzolo, In 
Remembrance: Houston’s ‘King of Torts’ Joe Jamail, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 23, 2015, 
3:48 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/12/23/in-remembrance-houstons-king-of-torts-joe-jamail/. 
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and unnecessarily interjected commentary such as “[c]ome on,” “[q]uit 
talking,” “[a]sk the question,” “[n]obody wants to socialize with you,” 
the court viewed its supervisory responsibility as requiring it to raise the 
lack of professionalism issue sua sponte.
55
  Not only does this behavior 
reflect poorly on lawyers, it “disserves the client because it wastes time 
and energy––time that is billed to the client at hundreds of dollars an 
hour, and energy that is better spent working on the case than working 
over the opponent.”
56
  These techniques are viewed as a deliberate effort 
to disrespect the deponent and, at a minimum, would impede, delay, or 
frustrate the fair examination in direct violation of Federal Rule 30.
57
  
Moreover, it is discourteous to the deponent and opposing counsel in 
violation of the District of Kansas Deposition Guidelines.
58
 
Across the river, the Western District of Missouri has not 
promulgated deposition guidelines.  Although court guidelines would be 
more instructive, the Western District of Missouri has “set the tone 
early” by including the Tenets of Professional Civility adopted by the 
Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Association (KCMBA) in court orders that 
govern discovery practice.
59
  Among the tenets is an instruction that 
“[c]ivility and professionalism among all lawyers is essential to the 
operation of our legal system.”
60
  Similarly, the District of Kansas has 
adopted the Kansas Bar Association’s Pillars of Professionalism.
61
  
                                                          
 55.  Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 n.23, 54 (Del. 1994).  The 
court also noted that counsel gave improper instructions not to answer.  Id. at 53.  But see Saldana v. 
Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 237–38 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing sanctions imposing on counsel who 
used the word “fuck” only four times, “pantomim[ing] a gagging gesture” during a deposition, and 
using the word “bullshit” on one occasion). 
 56.  Paramount Commc’ns, 637 A.2d at 52 n.24 (quoting The Hon. Sandra Day O’Connor, 
Address to the American Bar Association: “Civil Justice System Improvements,” 5 (Dec. 14, 1993)). 
 57.  Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 16, 2009) (resulting in economic sanctions and requiring counsel to take a CLE course in 
civility and professionalism); Zottola v. Anesthesia Consultants of Savannah, P.C., No. 411-154, 
2012 WL 6824150, at *7 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2012) (resulting in economic sanctions and future 
depositions to include video aimed at counsel); see Freeman v. Schointuck, 192 F.R.D. 187, 188–90 
(D. Md. 2000) (imposing economic sanctions and requiring counsel to write a letter of apology); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).  
 58.  See Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 1. 
 59.  Ross v. Kansas City Power and Light Co., 197 F.R.D. 646, 646 (W.D. Mo. 2000) 
(described as the “Tenets of Professional Courtesy,” however the name has been changed to 
“KCMBA Principles of Civility”); see Professionalism: KCMBA Principles of Civility, K.C. METRO. 
BAR ASS’N, 
https://kcmba.org/web/About_Us/Professionalism/web/KCMBA_Website/About_Us/Professionalis
m.aspx?hkey=62815980-4cd1-48e7-8d15-e37f8ff9f69d (last visited Mar. 31, 2016) [hereinafter 
Principles of Civility].  
 60.  Principles of Civility, supra note 59. 
 61.  United States v. Shelton, No. 14-10198, 2015 WL 7078931, at *3 n.16 (D. Kan. Nov. 30, 
 
2016] RETREAT TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE RULES 1075 
 
Noticeably absent from the KCMBA Tenets of Professional Civility is 
any express instruction for counsel to practice civility towards 
deponents.
62
  Compared to the Kansas Bar Association Pillars of 
Professionalism, the KCMBA civility guidelines are bare-boned.
63
  
However, should the court order adherence to the KCMBA tenets, they 
at least operate as a baseline to sanction the most egregious conduct 
between practitioners.
64
  For instance, in Ross v. Kansas City Power and 
Light Co., the district court highlighted the boorish behavior of both 
counsel in a deposition, which included the deposing attorney belittling 
the defending attorney after objections were lodged, protracted 
arguments between counsel regarding finger pointing, and quarreling that 
deteriorated into the lawyers comparing salaries.
65
  Because the 
obstreperous behavior was on both sides of the aisle, the court imposed 
significant monetary sanctions against both attorneys and ordered that 
they submit payment to a legal services entity.
66
  Moreover, the court 
directed the attorneys to provide a copy of the sanctioning order to their 
clients.
67
  The KCMBA tenets are a good starting point, but Kansas’s 




                                                          
2015). 
 62.  See Principles of Civility, supra note 59. 
 63.   Compare Principles of Civility, supra note 59, with Pillars of Professionalism, U.S. DIST. 
CT. FOR THE DIST. OF KAN., http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/pillars-of-professionalism/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2016). 
 64.  Ross, 197 F.R.D. at 646 (finding a violation of the KCMBA tenets included in the courts 
order after judicial recognition that the court has “witnessed few episodes which approach this case 
in vitriolic animus”).  
 65.  Id. at 657–58, 660; see also AKH Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 13-2003-
JAR-KGG, 2015 WL 141629, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2016) (describing counsel’s behavior as 
“harassment of the questioner” after review of the transcript quoted counsel as saying “[w]hat are 
you talking about,” “[b]ad question,” and “[a]sk a good question”). 
 66.  Ross, 197 F.R.D. at 664 (Plaintiff was ordered to pay $21,356.25, and defendant was 
ordered to pay $12,201.00.  The sanctions were suspended pending final disposition of the case.). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Compare AKH Co., 2015 WL 141629, at *3 (noting that the scheduling order mandated the 
application of the guidelines and imposing sanctions for violations), with Picard v. Guilford House, 
LLC, No. X03CV106016061S, 2014 WL 1876595, at *4 n.19, *6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014) 
(noting clear ethical violations and rude behavior to opposing counsel but only citing general rules of 
professional courtesy and deferring sanctions to the disciplinary board); see also Paramount 
Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 55–56 (Del. 1994) (declaring that “there is no clear 
mechanism for this Court to deal with this matter in terms of sanctions or disciplinary remedies at 
this time in the context of this case” because the court suspected its remedies were limited against an 
attorney who defended a deposition without being admitted pro hac vice).  But see Carroll v. Jaques 
Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1997) (“When a party’s deplorable conduct 
is not effectively sanctionable pursuant to an existing rule or statute, it is appropriate for a district 
court to rely on its inherent power to impose sanctions.”). 
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Ross highlights another important component of attorney incivility––
the “reputation factor.”  Particularly in Kansas or the Kansas City metro, 
where the practicing bar is relatively small, attorneys quickly gain a 
reputation for conduct during litigation.  Following the sanctions in Ross, 
one of the offending attorneys in that case (Michael Fletcher) once again 
engaged in incivility in an unrelated case.
69
  The Eighth Circuit 
recounted Fletcher’s conduct in several cases and described his 
borderline racist and harassing behavior as “an over-zealous attorney 
who frequently resorts to unprofessional tactics in an attempt to harass, 
humiliate and intimidate deponents and their counsel.”
70
  Ultimately, 
Fletcher’s behavior landed him in disciplinary proceedings in the 
Western District of Missouri.
71
  Citing violations of the Missouri Rules 
of Professional Conduct, the Western District of Missouri, sitting en 
banc, suspended Fletcher from practice before the Western District for 
three years, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
72
  Zealous advocacy is not a 
safe harbor; rather, counsel who hide behind their “warped view of 
zealous advocacy” through obstructionist discovery antics will quickly 
earn a reputation that is difficult to escape.
73
  Moreover, serial ignorance 
of the procedural rules and guidelines governing deposition conduct can 
result in more severe sanctions.  For instance, in Howard v. Offshore 
Liftboats, the Eastern District of Louisiana described an attorney’s 
checkered past with obstreperous deposition conduct and noted that his 
continued violations demonstrated that the monetary sanctions have had 
no effect to curb his behavior.
74
  As a result, in addition to monetary 
sanctions, the court ordered that counsel not participate in any future 
depositions for that particular case and circulated the opinion within the 
district.
75
  Finally, the court issued a clear warning to prevent any future 
conduct: “the sanction ordered . . . by me will be severe—in all 
likelihood more severe than this Court is empowered to employ.”
76
  
These well-deserved sanctions could be devastating for a practitioner and 
                                                          
 69.  In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 785–86 (8th Cir. 2005) (describing Fletcher’s behavior in the 
“Turner Litigation”).   
 70.  Id. at 790–91. 
 71.  Id. at 791. 
 72.  Id. at 791–92 (citing, in part, MO. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 4–4.4, 8.4 (“respecting the rights of 
third persons” and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice”)). 
 73.  Howard v. Offshore Liftboats, LLC, Nos. 13-4811, 13-6407, 2015 WL 965976, at *11 
(E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2015). 
 74.  Id. at *9. 
 75.  Id. at *10. 
 76.  Id. 
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serves as a useful reminder that one’s reputation truly precedes you. 
Similar, and possibly less discreet strategies, designed to frustrate 
opposing counsel also would presumably violate Kansas federal and state 
procedural rules.  For instance, in Oleson v. Kmart Corp., the District of 
Kansas imposed sanctions when counsel unreasonably demanded 
adherence to deposition schedules that extended beyond normal business 
hours despite the objections of opposing counsel.
77
  In Stengel v. 
Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd., a strategy of unnecessarily objecting to 
everyday terminology, compounded by statements overheard during a 
recess that defending counsel intended to “jerk” opposing counsel 




Obviously, sexism and racism serve no rightful purpose in any 
judicial proceeding.  Unfortunately, behavior of this sort can sometimes 
be a “‘dirty little secret,’ which, while undoubtedly occurring on a daily 
basis, no one speaks about in public.”
79
  A spontaneous single comment 
without reflection, despite violating the rules, may not be a basis to 
impose sanctions.
80
  However, repeated disparaging comments, or the 
use of even a single comment, violate Kansas rules, including the Kansas 
Rules of Professional Conduct, and may result in more serious sanctions 
than the typical economic penalty.
81
  Claypole v. County of Monterey is a 
                                                          
 77.  Oleson v. Kmart Corp., 175 F.R.D. 570, 573–74 (D. Kan. 1997); see also Picard v. 
Guilford House, LLC, No. X03CV106016061S, 2014 WL 1876595, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 
2014) (imposing sanctions in part because counsel only reserved the deposition room until 3:15 and 
delayed informing opposing counsel); see supra Part II.A. 
 78.  Stengel v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 116 F.R.D. 263, 267–68 (N.D. Tex. 1987) 
(imposing economic sanctions). 
 79.  Principe v. Assay Partners, 154 Misc. 2d 702, 706 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); see also Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Lawyer Threatened Opposing Counsel with Stun Gun During Deposition, Court 
Says in Upholding Sanction, ABA JOURNAL (Dec. 15, 2015, 05:45 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyer_sanctioned_for_not_becoming_of_a_woman_remar
k_discovery_conduct/ (quoting female counsel who declared that sexist comments are “something 
that almost every woman attorney has experienced again and again over their careers,” and “needs to 
change”). 
 80.  See Principe, 154 Misc. 2d at 707; see also Freeman v. Schointuck, 192 F.R.D. 187, 188–
90 (D. Md. 2000) (“While isolated acts of discourtesy or loss of temper can be expected, even from 
the best of counsel, and excused by the court, systematic and deliberate abuses such as displayed by 
Defendants’ counsel . . . cannot go unsanctioned . . . .”). 
 81.  Compare Principe, 154 Misc. 2d at 707 (noting that repeated gender biased comments of 
“little lady,” “young girl,” and “little girl” were primarily to harass or maliciously injure and 
imposing economic sanctions), with In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397, 399 (Minn. 1987) 
(suspending counsel from practicing law for six months following a racially charged comment: 
“[d]on’t use your little sheeny Hebrew tricks on me, Rosen.”); see also Claypole v. Cty. of 
Monterey, No. 14-cv-02730-BLF, 2016 WL 145557, at *4–5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2016) (imposing 
sanctions in response to a sexist remark: “[d]on’t raise your voice at me.  It’s not becoming of a 
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recent example of a “one-off” sexist comment that resulted in monetary 
sanctions.
82
  Citing guidelines that largely mirror the District of Kansas 
Deposition Guidelines, the Northern District of California sanctioned an 
attorney for a comment made at a contentious deposition: “Don’t raise 
your voice at me.  It’s not becoming of a woman . . . .”
83
  The court 
characterized the discourteous comment as endorsing a sexist stereotype 
that is “all too common” and chastised counsel for offering a 
“halfhearted politicians apology.”
84
  Judicial opinions of sexist remarks 
against women abound, however women are not immune to sanctions for 
similar disparaging remarks.  In Mendez v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, a 
female attorney was accused of ducking her head under the deposition 
table, examining the crotch of opposing counsel, and commenting 
“peanuts.”
85
  Although the trial court declined to impose sanctions, 
probably because the female lawyer denied the accusation, the judge 
plainly expressed his frustration with the lack of civility and requests for 
him to “[b]abysit[] lawyers at a deposition.”
86
  Citing Connecticut Rules 
of Professional Conduct 3.4(4) and 8.4(4), which emulate Kansas’s Rules 
of Professional Conduct verbatim, the Superior Court of Connecticut 
threatened swift and severe sanctions for future disparaging conduct.
87
 
Even when the client, rather than the lawyer, is acting in an 
obstreperous manner, counsel must act to mitigate the behavior in order 
to avoid sanctions.
88
  Because attorneys control the means of the 
litigation, counsel cannot idly “sit back, allow the deposition to proceed, 
and then blame the client when the deposition process breaks down.”
89
  
At a minimum, a lawyer’s failure to intercede may violate both federal 
and state procedural rules, Kansas ethical rules, and Kansas federal 
                                                          
woman . . . .”).  See also infra Part II.F. 
 82.  Id. at *4–5.  
 83.  Id. at *4. 
 84.  Id. at *4–5. 
 85.  See Motion of Def. for Re-Deposition at Ex. A 667–68, 673–74, Mendez v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank, N.A., No. X04HHDCV146049524S, 2016 WL 402008 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 2016). 
 86.  See Order Re: Motion Re: Depo. at 1, Mendez v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 
X04HHDCV146049524S, 2016 WL 402008 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 2015). 
 87.  Id. at 2; compare CONN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(4), 8.4(4), with KAN. R. PROF’L 
CONDUCT 3.4(4), 8.4(4).  
 88.  GMAC Bank v. HTFC Corp., 248 F.R.D. 182, 194–98 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (finding that 
counsel’s failure to intercede and correct the deponent’s repeated hostile, uncivil, and vulgar 
responses was the “functional equivalent of ‘advising conduct’ under Rule 37(a)(5)(A)” and violated 
Federal Rule 30). 
 89.  Id. at 195; see KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2. 





It is becoming more common for courts to consider the totality of the 
circumstances, rather than imposing the run-of-the-mill attorney fee 
sanctions.  Even when monetary sanctions are imposed, the court may 
consider whether the litigator is “a man of considerable wealth” and 
order more severe sanctions accordingly.
91
  More recently, in Security 
National Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Laboratories, the Northern 
District of Iowa imposed an unconventional sanction that required the 
offending litigator to produce a training video describing the court’s 
holding, and which “provides specific steps lawyers must take to comply 
with its rationale in future depositions.”
92
  Although the court’s unique 
sanction was ultimately reversed on appeal for failing to give the 
attorney proper notice,
93
 it signposts the inherent power and discretion 
courts have when determining the proper sanction.
94
 
2. Extreme Incivility and Unusual Behavior 
Although most attorneys are professional and courteous when 
conducting depositions, some cling to the argument that their extreme 
incivility is justified as an obligation to represent clients vigorously, 
aggressively, and zealously.  “To be vigorous, however, does not mean 
to be disruptively argumentative; to be aggressive is not a license to 




                                                          
 90.  Id. at 197–98; see KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2; see Deposition Guidelines, supra note 
11, ¶ 1. 
 91.  Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 293 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 92.  Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 596–97 (N.D. Iowa 
2014), rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 
944–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district court failed to give sufficient notice of unusual 
sanction). 
 93.  Jones Day, 800 F.3d at 944–45.  To be fair, the Eighth Circuit painted a different picture of 
the proceedings, noting that the defending counsel had never been sanctioned in her 31 years of 
practice and indicating that the trial court was unfairly criticizing counsel.  During the litigation, the 
district court criticized counsel for failing to cite non-controlling case law and made numerous 
derogatory comments in regard to how “out of state large firms waste tons [of] time.”  Id. at 938–39.  
Moreover, opposing counsel never raised an objection and the judge first assumed control of the case 
“sixteen months after defense counsel participated in the . . . depositions, one year after the fact 
discovery had closed, and nine months after [defendant] had moved for summary judgment based on 
excerpts of the depositions.”  Id. at 938–39, 943. 
 94.  See Kilgore v. Acad. Ltd., 86 F. Supp. 3d 1367, 1374 (M.D. Ga. 2015) (recognizing a 
training video as a proper sanction for egregious conduct); Gowan v. Mid Century Ins. Co., No. 
5:14-CV-05025-LLP, 2015 WL 7274448, at *4, *6 (D.S.D. Nov. 16, 2015). 
 95.  In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 397 (Minn. 1987).   
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Examples of extreme incivility during depositions shine a light on 
the type of behavior that would cause even a layperson to shudder.  In an 
oft-cited example, Corsini v. U-Haul International, the Supreme Court of 
New York dismissed a lawsuit when plaintiff, an attorney, mimicked 
opposing counsel’s speech pattern in a manner suggesting an ethnic slur 
and spewed forth a barrage of insults: 
You’re so scummy and so slimy and such a perversion of ethics or 
decency because you’re such a scared little man, you’re so insecure and 
so frightened and the only way you can impress your client is by being 
nasty, mean-spirited and ugly little man, and that’s what you are.  
That’s the kind of prostitution you are in.
96
 
Berating opposing counsel is never appropriate.  In Carroll v. Jaques 
Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., the Fifth Circuit affirmed sanctions against 
the appellant, a practicing attorney, for referring to opposing counsel as a 
“slimy son-of-a-bitch.”
97
  A more recent case involving a plaintiff’s 
attorney, acting pro se, provides an example of even more extreme 
behavior.  In Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, plaintiff filed on his 
own behalf numerous briefs with the court, referring to defendant as 
“Heavenly Father,” and the trial judge as defendant’s “pet dog” and “sick 
and demented.”
98
  At the deposition of plaintiff’s brother, plaintiff 
“pointed a can of pepper spray at counsel’s face from a distance of 
approximately three feet” while declaring “if things get out of hand, I 
brought what is legally pepper spray, and I will pepper spray you if you 
get out of hand.”
99
  Immediately thereafter, plaintiff “produced a stun 
gun, pointed it at [opposing counsel’s] head, and said, ‘If that doesn’t 
quell you, this is a flashlight that turns into a stun gun.’”
100
  The court of 
appeals affirmed dismissal of the case, and the California bar is seeking 
to disbar the attorney.
101
  Suffice it to say, extreme incivility of this 
nature would fall well outside the bounds of Kansas ethical rules and 
deposition rules and guidelines.
102
 
Less excessive––but equally sanctionable and possibly criminal—
                                                          
 96.  Corsini v. U-Haul Int’l, 212 A.D.2d 288, 289–93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
 97.  Carroll v. Jaques Admiralty Law Firm, P.C., 110 F.3d 290, 292 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 98.  Crawford v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 242 Cal. App. 4th 1265, 1270 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2015). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 1275; Weiss, supra note 79.  
 102.  See KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4(4), 8.4(4); Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 1; 
FED. R. CIV. P. 30. 
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conduct would similarly violate Kansas rules.  The method of recording a 
deposition must be stated in the notice of deposition, and in practice 
lawyers have begun to use inexpensive technology such as small video 
cameras to record depositions.
103
  Although practitioners may choose not 
to dispute a last-minute audio or video recording notice, secretly 
recording depositions is fraught with problems.  For instance, in Picard 
v. Guilford House, LLC, plaintiff’s counsel surreptitiously recorded a 
deposition on her iPhone, which included off-the-record conversations 
between defendant counsel and the deponent.
104
  This secret recording 
not only violated common sense and Rules of Professional Conduct, it 
was discourteous and arguably violated Federal anti-eavesdropping 
laws.
105
  The Superior Court of Connecticut imposed economic 




Kansas’s deposition guidelines, Rules of Professional Conduct, and 
the federal and state procedural rules provide instructive bounds for 
counsel to operate within.  Stepping outside these parameters could 
potentially expose practitioners to sanctions and obstruct the fact-finding 
that depositions are designed to yield.  Litigators should keep in mind 
that “[c]ivility is the mark of an accomplished and superb professional, 
but it is even more than this.  It is an end in itself.  Civility has deep roots 
in the idea of respect for the individual.”
107
 
C. On-the-Record Witness Coaching––Speaking Objections and 
Instructions Not to Answer 
On-the-record witness coaching by lawyers via suggestive objections 
or instructions not to answer is increasingly soliciting the judiciary’s ire.  
Judges are becoming increasingly aware that ignoring this common 
problem may “reinforce––even incentivize––obstructionist tactics.”
108
  
                                                          
 103.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(3)(A).  Note that prior notice is required to designate another method 
of recording the deposition.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(3)(B). 
 104.  Picard v. Guilford House, LLC, No. X03CV106016061S, 2014 WL 1876595, at *2 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2014). 
 105.  Id. at *3–4. 
 106.  Id. at *4 n.19, *9. 
 107.  Huggins v. Coatesville Area Sch. Dist., No. 07-4917, 2009 WL 2973044, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 16, 2009) (quoting Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy’s speech at the 1997 ABA 
Annual Meeting (July 31, 1997)). 
 108.  Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 597 (N.D. Iowa 
2014), rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 
944–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district court failed to give sufficient notice of unusual 
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The genus of sanctioning suggestive objections, and practice guidelines 
which seek to proactively avoid such behavior, can be traced to the oft-
cited 1993 opinion Hall v. Clifton Precision.
109
  Although most courts 
have declined to follow Hall’s narrow off-the-record conferencing rule, 
the Hall “guidelines” are widely accepted and directly analogous to the 
District of Kansas’s deposition guidelines.
110
  Federal Rule 30(c) is also 
clear in this regard.  It reads in part: “An objection must be stated 
concisely in a nonargumentative and nonsuggestive manner.  A person 
may instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a 
privilege, to enforce a limitation ordered by the court, or to present a 
motion under Rule 30(d)(3).”
111
 
In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Serrano, District of Kansas magistrate 
judge Gale provided a brief and succinct opinion about the 
appropriateness of speaking objections.  He stated that proper objections 
must be timely, and “relate[] to the manner of taking the deposition, the 
form of a question or answer, the oath or affirmation, a party’s conduct, 
or other matters that might have been corrected at that time.”
112
  Further, 
magistrate judge Gale analyzed the Deposition Guidelines, noting the 
District of Kansas promulgated them “to facilitate the efficient and fair 
conduct of depositions.”
113
  These instructive guidelines provide in part: 
Objections.  Objections shall be concise and shall not suggest answers 
to or otherwise coach the deponent.  Argumentative interruptions will 
not be permitted. The only objections that should be asserted are those 
involving privilege or work product protection or some matter that 
maybe remedied if presented at the time, such as an objection to the 
form of the question or the responsiveness of the answer.  Other 
objections shall be avoided unless the deposition is being taken for the 
express purpose of preserving testimony. . . . 
. . . .  Directions not to answer.  Counsel shall not direct or request that 
a deponent not answer a question, unless (1) counsel has objected to the 
question on the ground that the answer is protected by privilege, work 
product immunity, or a limitation on evidence directed by the Court; or 
                                                          
sanction). 
 109.  Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 530–31 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (noting that “[w]ithout 
guidelines on suggestive objections, the spirit of the prohibition against private conferences could be 
flouted by a lawyer’s making of lengthy objections which contain information suggestive of an 
answer to a pending question” and imposing detailed guidelines for discovery depositions). 
 110.  Compare id. at 531–32, with Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11. 
 111.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(2). 
 112.  Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 
2012) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(3)(B)(i)). 
 113.  Id.  
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(2) the direction not to answer is necessary to allow a party or deponent 
to present a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(d) motion to the Court. When privilege 
or work product immunity is asserted, the witness is nevertheless 
required to answer questions relevant to the existence, extent, or waiver 
of the privilege/immunity, such as the date of a communication, who 




As magistrate judge Gale demonstrated in Serrano, the District of 
Kansas can, and will, mandate application of these guidelines.
115
  As a 
baseline, these guidelines are instructive and provide a useful tool for 
both practitioners and judges in assessing improper use of speaking 
objections and the appropriateness of instructions not to answer. 
1. Speaking Objections 
The District of Kansas’s Guidelines support Federal Rule 30 and 32 
and highlight some important concepts: “One is to prohibit objections, 
which suggest answers to or otherwise coach the witness, commonly 
called ‘speaking objections.’  The other is to make clear that objections 
which need not be made to preserve the objection under Rule 32, should 




As previously mentioned, Kansas state courts have not promulgated 
specific practice rules or guidelines governing deposition conduct, but 
the Kansas Rules of Professional Conduct might be stretched to 
encompass improper speaking objections and provide a basis for 
sanctions, especially if the offending lawyer’s conduct is egregious.
117
 
a. “Form” Objections 
There is not a national consensus as to whether objections to the 
form of a question are improper.  For instance, in the Northern District of 
Iowa, merely stating “objection, form” is insufficient.
118
  Under this view 
                                                          
 114.  Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a), (b). 
 115.  AKH Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 13-2003-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 141629, 
at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2016). 
 116.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *4; Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a), (b). 
 117.  KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4, 8.4; see also infra Part II.F. 
 118.  Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 602 (N.D. Iowa 
2014) rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 
944–45 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district court failed to give sufficient notice of unusual 
sanction). 
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of Federal Rules 30 and 32, “objecting to ‘form’ is like objection to 
‘improper’––it does no more than vaguely suggest that the objector takes 
issue with the question.”
119
  Courts that operate under this principle 
require lawyers to state the basis for their objections.
120
  On the other end 
of the spectrum, some courts stringently require counsel to merely utter 








In Serrano, the District of Kansas took a more moderate approach, 
allowing counsel to object to form and “briefly specify the nature of the 
form objection (e.g. ‘compound,’ ‘leading,’ ‘assumes facts not in 
evidence’).”
124
  Although not directly taking a position as to whether 
“objection to form” would preserve a Federal Rule 32 objection, 
magistrate judge Gale “expects that it would be adequate if the 
question’s defect was in that broad category and if the deposing attorney 
failed to request clarification at the deposition.”
125
  Even though 
magistrate judge Gale would allow a brief explanation following an 
objection, inserting non-descriptive efforts to coach, such as, “[t]ough for 
anybody to do that,”
126
 would be deemed sanctionable as “an 
inappropriate speaking objection and improper ‘argumentative 
interruption.’”
127
  Because the District of Kansas has not taken a 
definitive position as to whether a failure to specify the nature of the 
form objection preserves a Federal Rule 32 objection, practitioners 
should briefly describe the nature of the form objection but be cognizant 
                                                          
 119.  Id.   
 120.  Id. at 602 (noting that objections should be brief, and “state in a few words the manner in 
which the question is defective as to form (e.g., compound, vague as to time, misstates the record, 
etc.)” (quoting Rakes v. Life Investors Ins. Co. of Am., No. C06-0099, 2008 WL 429060, at *5 
(N.D. Iowa Feb. 14, 2008))). 
 121.  Druck Corp. v. Macro Fund (U.S.) Ltd., No. 02 Civ. 6164, 2005 WL 1949519, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2005). 
 122.  Turner v. Glock, Inc., No. 1:02cv825, 2004 WL 5511620, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2004). 
 123.  In re St. Jude Med., Inc., No. 1396, 2002 WL 1050311, at *5 (D. Minn. May 24, 2002). 
 124.  Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 
2012) (italics omitted).  Although the District of Kansas allows counsel to object as to “leading,” the 
court does not allow derivatives of that same objection, i.e. objection “suggestive,” which are viewed 
as a warning to the deponent not to agree.  Id. at *6. 
 125.  Id. at *5.  Although the District of Kansas has detailed guidelines, Serrano identified one 
gaping hole that should be addressed with specific directions on what type of form objections are 
proper.  Id.  The lack of any local rules, or specific guidelines, leads to a “damned if you do, damned 
if you don’t” conundrum that can retroactively present defense counsel with a “Catch-22.”  Brief of 
Appellant at 41, Sec. Nat’l Bank v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2015). 
 126.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5. 
 127.  Id. 
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of the risk such an explanation may entail. 
b. Clarification Inducing and “Answer, if you know” Objections 
The Serrano opinion not only analyzed form objections, but it 
evaluated other common speaking objections as well.  According to 
magistrate judge Gale, objections that seek to “clarify” a question are 
improper.  “Speculation” is an objection as to foundation “is not waived 
if omitted under Rule 32, and is improper under Rule 30 and the [District 
of Kansas] guidelines.”
128
  Foundation objections, at their core, are 
relevancy objections, and “need not be made at the time of the 
deposition.”
129
  In AKH Co. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., 
magistrate judge Gale reiterated that relevancy objections “of all stripes 
are improper.”
130
  Similarly, “[a]n objection that a question is ‘over 
broad’” is essentially an objection that the question exceeds the scope of 
discovery and is inappropriate.
131
  This does not mean that defending 
counsel should sit idly by and allow interrogating counsel to harass the 
witness, or delve into clearly irrelevant and over broad subject matter 
carte blanche.  The District of Kansas’s Deposition Guidelines
132
 do not 
specifically address questions that exceed the scope of discovery. 
However, in Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
133
 magistrate judge 
O’Hara directed counsel to conduct their depositions in accordance with 
an “eloquent[]” Southern District of Ohio case, Ethicon Endo–Surgery v. 
U.S. Surgical Corp..
134
  In Ethicon, the court declared: 
Where the objection is to irrelevant or repetitious questions, and 
interrogating counsel persists in such questioning after objection, 
opposing counsel’s remedy lies in applying to the court for a protective 
order or sanctions; counsel does not have the right to unilaterally decide 
such issues by instructing the witness not to answer.
135
 
                                                          
 128.  Id. at *4. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  No. 13-2003-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 141629, at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2016).  “Generously 
interpreted, the following objections were improper relevance or foundation objections: overbroad, 
speculation, lack of foundation, misstates the testimony, out of context, assumes facts not in 
evidence, the document speaks for itself, misstates the document, improper or incomplete 
hypothetical, legal conclusion, improper hypothetical, calls for expert opinion.”  Id. at *4 n.6. 
 131.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5. 
 132.  Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a). 
 133.  Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 203 F.R.D. 624, 631 (D. Kan. 2001). 
 134.  Ethicon Endo–Surgery v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 
 135.  Id. at 99. 
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Counsel should assess the situation, and if: 
the examination so exceeds the scope of discovery that it evidences bad 
faith on the part of the questioner, or results in questioning which 
“unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the deponent,” 
counsel may object as a prerequisite (see D. Kan. Rule 37.2, requiring 
conference prior to motion) to bringing a motion to terminate or limit 
the deposition under Rule 30(d)(3).
136
 
A District of Kansas case, Layne Christenson Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 
suggests that this standard is not easily met, and upon invoking Federal 




Even if certain objections fall outside the prohibited “relevancy” 
regime, other forms of “clarification-inducing” objections, such as 
“objection, vague,” (disguised as a form objection) coach the witness and 
are a prompt that the witness should ask for clarification or refuse to 
answer.
138
  For instance, in Security National Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. 
Abbott Laboratories, where defending counsel lodged no fewer than 65 
“form” objections, the court described the counsel-witness duo as a “tag-
team” that delivered the “one-two punch of ‘objection’––‘rephrase.’”
139
  
Such objections will likely result in sanctions that include re-deposing 
the witness because it will be “impossible to know if [a witness’s] 
answers emanated from her own line of reasoning or whether she 
adopted [the] lawyer’s reasoning from listening to his objections.”
140
  
Moreover, this type of objection is often accompanied with protracted 
explanatory dialogue, which is an independent basis for sanctions 
because it unnecessarily delays the deposition and is improper under 
                                                          
 136.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5.  It does mean, however, that objections that a question is 
“over broad,” “harassing,” or “argumentative” are only appropriate in this instance.  Id. 
 137.  Layne Christenson Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., No. 09-2381-JWL-GLR, 2011 WL 4688836, at 
*6 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 2011). 
 138.  Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa v. Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. 595, 604 (N.D. Iowa 
2014) (describing objections of “‘vague,’ called for ‘speculation,’ were ‘ambiguous,’ or were 
‘hypothetical’” as coaching objections) rev’d on other grounds, Sec. Nat’l Bank of Sioux City, Iowa 
v. Jones Day, 800 F.3d 936, 944 (8th Cir. 2015) (reversing because the district court failed to give 
sufficient notice of unusual sanction); Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5; Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 
F.R.D. 525, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting Committee Notes to the 1993 proposed amendments as 
noting “lengthy objections and colloquy, often suggest[] how the deponent should respond.”). 
 139.  Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. at 605 (noting that counsel’s objections were merely an effort to 
solicit the deponents “Pavlonian response[s]”). 
 140.  Cordova v. United States, No. CIV 05-563 JB/LFG, 2006 WL 4109659, at *3 (D.N.M. July 
30, 2006). 




  At surface-level, these forms of witness-coaching 
highlight the importance of the on-the-record admonition colloquy at the 
commencement of depositions.  Such an admonition typically places the 
witness on notice that it is his duty to request clarification of a question, 
if needed, and it serves as an important tool to remind opposing counsel 
that any clarification by the witness can be done at the end of 




Instructing a witness to answer “if they know” is akin to directly 
instructing the witness to respond “I don’t know” to the question––even 
if they really do know the answer.  Put another way, “[w]hen a lawyer 
tells a witness to answer “if you know,” it not-so-subtly suggests that the 
witness may not know the answer, inviting the witness to dodge or 
qualify an otherwise clear question.”
143
  There really is no middle-ground 
for this form of objection, as District of Kansas magistrate judge Gale 
articulately phrased it in Serrano: “Instructions to a witness that they 
may answer a question ‘if they know’ or ‘if they understand the question’ 
are raw, unmitigated coaching, and are never appropriate.”
144
  In Mazzeo 
v. Gibbons, a District of Nevada magistrate judge imposed sanctions for 
this type of instruction in a scathing opinion, which concluded: 
 
If I was an elementary school teacher instead of a judge I 
would require both counsel to write the following clearly 
established legal rules on a blackboard 500 times: I will 
not make speaking, coaching, suggestive objections 
which violate Rule 30(c)(2). . . .  I know that speaking 
objections such as “if you remember,” “if you know,” 
“don’t guess,” “you’ve answered the question,” and “do 
you understand the question” are designed to coach the 
witness and are improper.
145
 
                                                          
 141.  Id. at 609; see FED. R. CIV. P. 30; Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 5(a). 
 142.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5; see Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 526 (examining the deposition 
transcript and noting that counsel admonished the deponent to “[c]ertainly ask me to clarify any 
questions that you do not understand”). 
 143.  Abbott Labs., 299 F.R.D. at 604. 
 144.  Serrano, 2012 WL 28071, at *5 (noting that instructions in the same vein, such as “[i]f you 
know the difference between the two,” are similarly sanctionable) (emphasis in original); see also 
Lund v. Matthews, No. 8:13CV144, 2014 WL 517569, at *5 (D. Neb. Feb. 7, 2014) (imposing 
sanctions where defending counsel injected commentary following his objection: “if you know,” and 
“to the best of your ability”). 
 145.  Mazzeo v. Gibbons, No. 2:08-cv-01387-RLH-PAL, 2010 WL 3020021, at *2 (D. Nev. July 
27, 2010). 
1088 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
2. Instructions Not to Answer 
Because instructing a witness not to answer a question may result in 
a subsequent motion to compel because it violates Federal Rule 30, 
counsel should use this instruction with care.  Directing a “deponent not 
to answer a question can be even more disruptive than objections.”
146
  
Under Federal Rule 30: 
 
An instruction not to answer is appropriate only when 
necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation 
ordered by the court, or to present a motion to terminate 
or limit a deposition being conducted in bad faith or in a 
manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses or 




Although counsel may feel the urge to instruct a witness not to 
answer if a question has been asked and answered or it is beyond the 
personal knowledge of their client—unless the question satisfies the 
Federal Rule 30 standard—such an instruction would be improper.
148
  
Litigators who instruct their client not to answer have the burden of 




An instruction not to answer based on privilege or work product 
immunity does not obviate the witness from answering subsequent 
questions regarding the “existence, extent, or waiver” of the privilege or 
immunity.
150
  Moreover, at least some courts are of the mind that private 
conferences, except for the purposes of determining whether a privilege 
should be asserted, are “not covered by the attorney-client privilege, at 
                                                          
 146.  Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 530 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 30 Committee Notes to the 1993 proposed 
amendments). 
 147.  AKH Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 13-2003-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 141629, 
at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2016) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c)(3), 30(d)(3)); Deposition Guidelines, 
supra note 11,  ¶ 5(a). 
 148.  AKH Co., 2016 WL 141629, at *3 (noting that questions counsel considered unclear or 
lacking foundation were not a basis for instructing the witness not to answer); Paramount Commc’ns 
v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 52 n.3, 54 (Del. 1994). 
 149.  Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266–67 (10th Cir. 1995) (affirming 
sanctions where counsel could not meet his burden of proving that each instruction was protecting 
work product and criticizing counsel’s blanket instruction not to answer). 
 150.  See Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11, ¶ 5(b) (noting that follow-up questions “such as 
the date of a communication, who made it, to whom it has been disclosed, and its general subject 
matter” are appropriate). 
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least as to what is said by the lawyer to the witness” and are “fair game 
for inquiry by the deposing attorney to ascertain whether there has been 
any coaching and, if so, what.”
151
  Even when practitioners do not 
expressly instruct the witness not to answer, but previous objections or 
suggestions encourage the witness to refuse to answer questions within 
that category, the court may determine that counsel influenced the 
obstructive behavior.
152
  One method for circumventing improper 
instructions not to answer is to circle-back to the question later in the 
deposition, after an over-zealous attorney has had the opportunity to cool 
down.
153
  Undoubtedly, an instruction not to answer “impedes, delays or 
frustrates the fair examination of the deponent” and the District of 




Make no mistake, it is a mark of professionalism “for a lawyer 
zealously and firmly to protect and pursue a client’s legitimate 
interests.”
155
  Improper speaking objections and instructions not to 
answer, however, are unprofessional and detract from the fact-finding 
mission of depositions.  Litigators should be cautioned that behavior of 
this sort does not advance the interest of one’s client; rather, such 
attempts to “harass, humiliate and intimidate deponents and their 
counsel” represent an “over-zealous attorney” who potentially violates 




D. Off-the-Record Witness Coaching––Improper Use of Conferencing 
to Coach a Deponent or Interrupt Proceedings 
Once the deponent is sworn in and the deposition begins, under 
Federal Rule 30(c), “[t]he examination and cross-examination of a 
deponent proceed as they would at trial under the Federal Rules of 
                                                          
 151.  Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 527, 529 n.7; see also infra Part II.D. 
 152.  Cordova v. United States, No. CIV 05-563 JB/LFG, 2006 WL 4109659, at *5 (D.N.M. July 
30, 2006). 
 153.  MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 273–76. 
 154.  AKH Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 13-2003-JAR-KGG, 2016 WL 141629, 
at *4 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2016) (imposing monetary sanctions, and requiring local counsel to be 
present during all future depositions in which the violating pro hac vice attorney participated); see 
KAN. R.  PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4 (noting that a lawyer shall not “unlawfully obstruct another party’s 
access to evidence”). 
 155.  Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 54 (Del. 1994). 
 156.  In re Fletcher, 424 F.3d 783, 790–91 (8th Cir. 2005). 




  Importantly, Federal Rule 30(c) does not address the 
propriety of attorney and client consultations that typically occur during 
short breaks in a deposition, at lunch, overnight, or at any other time 
during the deposition process.  Not surprisingly, section 60-230 of the 
Kansas statutes does not address the matter either.
158
 
The reality is that private conferencing between a lawyer and his 
client is an accepted part of deposition practice, but these consultations, 
no matter when they occur, are rife with suspicion and potential abuse.
159
  
Improper witness coaching frequently happens, which begs the question 
as to why there is no formal regulation to limit private discussions 
between the lawyer and his client-deponent.  The short and easy answer 
may be that conferencing is impossible to regulate due to the practical 
and conventional realities of the deposition process itself.
160
  For 
instance, it is accepted practice that every lawyer confers with his client 
in some way and for various reasons during normal breaks taken at the 
deposition, like restroom or lunch breaks.  Also, because of the 
importance of the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality, any 
regulation of private conversations between a lawyer and client seems 
antithetical to these inviolate client protections. 
1. Legitimate Reasons for Conferencing Under Federal Rule 30 and 
State Deposition  Rules 
Notwithstanding the practical necessity for normal recesses in a 
deposition, a focus on Federal Rule 30(c) and the Kansas state 
counterpart, section 60-230(c), suggests that there are only two 
legitimate reasons for which a lawyer has the right to confer with his 
deponent-client during the deposition.  The first purpose concerns the 
protection of a privilege, and it allows a lawyer to interrupt a deposition 
if necessary to confer with a client about whether such a privilege 
exists.
161
  If a privilege does exist, the lawyer can instruct his client not to 
answer a deposition question in order to protect the deponent from 
jeopardizing privileged information.
162
  Importantly, a lawyer does not 
                                                          
 157.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c). 
 158.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230 (Supp. 2015). 
 159.  For comprehensive discussion of this topic, see A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of 
Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 12–26 (1998). 
 160.  Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *6 (D. Kan. Jan. 5, 
2012).  
 161.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(c) (2015). 
 162.  Id.; see also supra Part II.C.1. 
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share an attorney-client relationship with a third party deponent.
163
  Thus, 
counsel would have no legal basis to confer regarding any privileged 
matters with this type of independent witness. 
The second legitimate reason for private conferencing is that the 
client may need advice about clarifying his previous deposition answers.  
If this is the basis for a conference, however, the lawyer is not permitted 
to interrupt the deposition under federal and state procedural rules; 
rather, counsel may later confer with his client during a normal break in 
the deposition.
164
  Again, whether a lawyer may confer with a deponent 
with whom he does not enjoy an attorney-client relationship even for 
purposes of clarifying prior deposition testimony is highly questionable, 
and probably improper.  The basis for allowing a lawyer-client 
consultation to clarify prior testimony does not rise explicitly from 
Federal Rule 30(c) itself, but instead from the wealth of case law 
interpreting Federal Rule 30(e).
165
  As will be discussed below, 
subsection (e) of Federal Rule 30 allows a deponent to review his 
transcript once it is prepared and to make alterations to deposition 
testimony either in form or substance.
166
  The Kansas state deposition 
rule allows for the same.
167
  Though the federal courts are divided on the 
types and breadth of changes permitted on an errata sheet, the case law 
seems to be overwhelmingly consistent on one point—a deponent is 
permitted to alter testimony after the deposition so as to clarify 
deposition answers.
168
  In fact, under Federal Rule 30(e) and K.S.A. 
section 60-230, the deponent is allowed 30 days to do so.
169
  Thus, 
judicial interpretation of Federal Rule 30(e), in the context of allowing a 
deponent to change his testimony after the deposition, strongly supports 
private conferencing between a lawyer and client during normal recesses 
for the purpose of discussing whether clarification of prior deposition 
testimony is necessary and if it should be done while the deposition is 
happening. 
Significantly, it is the private nature of off-the-record discussions 
that occur between a lawyer and a client, including what may well be 
                                                          
 163.  See KAN. R. PROF. CONDUCT Scope ¶ 17 (“Most of the duties flowing from the client-
lawyer relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and 
the lawyer has agreed to do so.”).   
 164.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 165.  See infra notes 243–45.  
 166.  Id. 
 167.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(c) (Supp. 2015). 
 168.  See infra notes 243–45. 
 169.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230(c) (2015); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e). 
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innocuous chit-chat, which can foster suspicions of improper conduct, 
such as witness-coaching.  These side-bar conversations create 
uncertainties in the eyes of opposing counsel because they are “known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not 
know”
170
 regarding the communication, and we suspect the lawyer may 
be coaching his client about how to testify in the deposition.  Further, 
despite what little guidance Federal Rule 30 and interpretive case law 
provide in this regard, we do know that courts frown upon any 
discussions involving a lawyer reassuring his client that his testimony is 
helpful, or warning the client that his prior testimony has been 
harmful.
171
  Definitively, these kinds of discussions between a lawyer 
and a client are presumptively improper under both the rules of federal 
and state procedure, and may be viewed as witness-coaching.
172
 
To be clear, the only right a deponent has to consult with counsel at a 
deposition exists by virtue of judicial interpretation of Federal Rule 
30(c), which allows interruption of the deposition for the lawyer and the 
client to confer about the existence of a privilege.
173
  Excluding this 
allowance, the rule does not speak about or authorize any other 
conferences between a lawyer and his client during the deposition itself, 
or during normal breaks.  Relatedly, as a matter of federal constitutional 
law, it has been held that a client in a criminal case does not have a right 
to confer with his lawyer at all during breaks of his trial.
174
  In Perry v. 
Leeke,
175
 a state trial court order directed that a defendant could not 
consult with his attorney during a fifteen-minute recess that was taken 
while he testified in his own defense.  The Supreme Court held that the 
state court’s order did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to assistance of counsel.
176
  Though Perry is a criminal case, which 
addressed a defendant’s constitutional right to counsel in a trial setting, 
the Perry holding has been interpreted to mean that any rules, guidelines, 
                                                          
 170.  David A. Graham, Rumsfeld’s Knowns and Unknowns: The Intellectual History of a Quip, 
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/03/rumsfelds-
knowns-and-unknowns-the-intellectual-history-of-a-quip/359719/.  
 171.  See generally Dickerson, supra note 159, at 314–25, 314 n.196.  
 172.  But see In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Nev. 1998) (holding 
that it was not improper for a lawyer to use a recess of a deposition to prepare his witness). 
 173.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c).  This paragraph of the rule allows a lawyer to terminate a deposition 
if the deposition is being conducted in “bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, 
embarrass, or oppress deponent.”  Id. 
 174.  See, e.g., Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989). 
 175.  Id. at 274. 
 176.  Id. at 280. 
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or court orders that limit a deponent’s right to confer with his lawyer 
during breaks are permissible in a civil deposition.
177
 
As previously discussed, in Hall v. Clifton Precision the District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed the precise issue 
of “to what extent may a lawyer confer with a client, off-the-record and 
outside earshot of the other lawyers, during a deposition of the client.”
178
  
In holding that the lawyer and client do not have an absolute right to 
confer during the deposition, the court artfully stated: “The witness 
comes to the deposition to testify, not to indulge in a parody of Charlie 
McCarthy,
179
 with lawyers coaching or bending the witness’s words to 
mold a legally convenient record.  It is the witness—not the lawyer—
who is the witness.”
180
  Among the laudable points concerning deposition 
practice raised in Hall, the court sought to limit opportunities in which a 
lawyer could coach a client in a deposition.  The court stated that judges 
have broad discretion over managing and controlling discovery matters 
in a case, and it invoked Federal Rules 26(f), 30, and 37(a) to issue a 
blanket order prohibiting all lawyer-client conferencing in a 
deposition.
181
  The court’s reason for curtailing all conferencing, even 
during coffee, restroom and lunch breaks, as well as overnight recesses, 
is because in the court’s view, conferences between attorney and client 




This portion of the Hall decision did not gain any traction, and most  
federal courts have since declined to follow Hall’s reasoning and strict 
ruling despite the district court’s straightforward and accurate analysis of 
the applicable Federal Rules.
183
  In fact, Hall seems to be a lone rider in 
its prohibition of all lawyer-client conferencing in depositions.  Most 
federal courts, and even state courts, do not explicitly prohibit 
conferencing between an attorney and client at a deposition, and many 
                                                          
 177.  See Dickerson, supra note 159, at 317 n.214 (citing Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623 F.2d 
845, 858–59 (3d Cir. 1980)).  
 178.  Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 526 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 179.  Charlie McCarthy was a ventriloquist dummy and not a real person.  See Home Page, 
CHARLIE MCCARTHY: OLD TIME RADIO, http://www.charliemccarthy.org/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2016). 
 180.  Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528 (internal footnote added). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., 142 PITT. LEG. J. 225 (1993).  The Court 
of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania declined to follow Hall for many reasons, including that: (1) they 
provide insufficient protection for the client; (2) they can produce results that could not have been 
intended; and (3) they fail to recognize the proper role of counsel.  Id. 
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allow conferences to occur under certain conditions, like normal breaks.  
For example, in State ex rel. Means v. King,
184
 the Supreme Court of 
West Virginia discussed a lower court’s order that prohibited plaintiff 
and her counsel from conferencing during the deposition breaks, as well 
as the overnight break.
185
  Apparently following the reasoning 
established in Hall, the trial court stated in its order that “once the 
Plaintiff i[s] placed under oath for her deposition or any other sworn 
testimony, discussions between Plaintiff and her counsel are 
inappropriate.”
186
  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia declined to follow Hall and revised the trial court’s order, 
holding that a lawyer may confer with his client during a normal break in 
a discovery deposition so long as the lawyer does not interrupt the 




Taking an even more liberal position regarding conferencing 
protocol, in In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litigation,
188
 a magistrate 
judge in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada held that it was 
not improper for an attorney to confer with his client during a break in a 
deposition “to make sure that his . . . client did not misunderstand or 
misinterpret [deposition] questions,” nor was it improper for the lawyer 
to use a normal recess “to help rehabilitate the client by fulfilling [his] 
ethical duty to prepare a witness.”
189
 
In 2001, in McKinley Infuser, Inc. v. Zdeb,
190
 the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Colorado addressed, among a variety of issues arising 
in a deposition, a lawyer’s role in his client’s decision to change his prior 
deposition testimony.  While the court did not directly address improper 
conferencing at the deposition, it did make some key points about the 
common practice, distinguishing between situations where an attorney 
seeks to interrupt the deposition when a question is pending to coach his 
client from a situation where an attorney consults with his or her client 
on a later or earlier occasion.
191
  The court ruled that the truth-finding 
                                                          
 184.  State ex rel. Means v. King, 520 S.E.2d 875 (W.Va. 1999). 
 185.  Id. at 878. 
 186.  Id. at 877. 
 187.  Id. at 875. 
 188.  In re Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig.,182 F.R.D. 614 (D. Nev. 1998). 
 189.  Id. at 621; see also Odone v. Croda Int’l PLC., 170 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding 
that five-minute consultation between deponent and his attorney did not warrant sanctions or 
redeposition of deponent regarding content of discussions between the client and the lawyer). 
 190.  McKinley Infuser, Inc. v. Zdeb, 200 F.R.D. 648 (D. Colo. 2001). 
 191.  Id.  
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function of the deposition is adequately protected so long as there is no 
coaching while a question is pending and that subsequent consultations, 
even after a prolonged recess are permitted.
192
 
2. Local District Court Guidelines 
To date, due to the scant case law in this area, it is not surprising that 
there is no interpretive judicial decision in the Tenth Circuit or in the 
Kansas state practice that directly addresses the propriety of attorney-
client conferencing in a deposition.  It is interesting that over 20 years 
ago, the court in Hall noted that “there is not a lot of caselaw” on this 
issue.
193
  That assessment remains true today.  Since the few court 
interpretations of this topic are inconsistent, any limitations on what a 
lawyer and a client-deponent can discuss privately, and off-the-record, 
during normal breaks are not entirely clear.  Moreover, any nationwide 
formal regulation of this type of conferencing remains unlikely.  This 
means that practitioners are left with jurisdictional practice guidelines, 
standing orders, and ethical rules, to guide them in how to properly 
engage, if at all, in conferencing with their client during a deposition 
recess. 
As previously mentioned, in an effort to be proactive in curbing 
ongoing deposition practice abuse, the District of Kansas has established 
Deposition Guidelines to regulate and guide attorney conduct in the area 
of deposition practice.
194
  Paragraph 5(c), “Private consultation,” written 
in bold lettering, follows Federal Rule 30(c) and permits private 
conferences between a deponent and a lawyer during the actual taking of 
the deposition but only to determine whether a privilege or work product 
immunity exists.
195




The guideline goes on to provide that unless the court prohibits 
conferencing for good cause shown, any off-the-record consultations 
between a lawyer and a client may be conducted during normal recesses 
                                                          
 192.  Id. at 650. 
 193.  Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993). 
 194.  See Pretrial and Trial Guidelines for Hon. Thomas Marten, U.S. DIST. CT. FOR THE DIST. 
OF KAN., http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/guidelines-for-parties-and-counsel/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2016) (“Depositions.  Review [FED. R. CIV. P.] 28–31 carefully.  Depositions are not contests to see 
how much information a witness and her or his lawyer can avoid disclosing.”). 
    195.    Deposition Guidelines, supra note 11,¶ 5(c).  
 196.  Id. 




  However, these private consultations may be subject 
to inquiry by deposing counsel to determine whether there has been any 
witness-coaching; and, if so, deposing counsel may inquire on-the-
record, once the deposition recommences, what was discussed between 
the deponent and counsel.  Lastly, the guideline provides that “[i]n such 
inquiry, the Court may determine whether, under applicable law, the 
parties to such a [sic] conferences have waived any attorney-client 
privilege.”
198
  Interpreted as a whole, Paragraph 5(c) of the Deposition 
Guidelines helps to set the limitations and conditions of attorney-client 
conferencing that are permitted in Kansas federal deposition practice. 
The Kansas state deposition rule, section 60-230(c) is also silent 
about deposition protocol concerning conferencing during a deposition, 
except like the federal rule, the state rule seems to allow an interruption 
of the deposition for purposes of allowing the lawyer and client to 
discuss a potential privilege issue.  But unlike the federal district court 
Deposition Guidelines, there are no such guidelines promulgated by the 
Kansas Supreme Court for state practitioners.  Thus, the only way a 
concern about improper conferencing is addressed in state practice is 
either through: (1) a discovery order issued by the district court under 
section 60-237, which can be crafted to limit or prohibit private 
conferences; or (2) through stipulation of the parties to use the District of 
Kansas Deposition Guidelines. 
E. Improper Use of Errata Sheets 
The use of the errata sheet to change deposition testimony is 
controversial in deposition practice, and the federal courts have long 
disagreed about the types of corrections that a deponent may make after 
he has had the opportunity to review the transcript and reflect on his 
deposition testimony.
199
  Under Federal Rule 30(e), the deponent is 
allowed to review his deposition transcript once the court reporter 




                                                          
 197.  Id. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  See A. Darby Dickerson, Deposition Dilemmas: Vexations Scheduling and Errata Sheets, 
12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (Fall 1998); Devon Energy Corp. v. Westacott, No. H-09-1689, 2011 
WL 1157334 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2011) (opinion provides analysis of both the narrow and broad 
applications of FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)). 
 200.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e) (emphasis added). 
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According to its strict definition, the purpose of the errata sheet is to 
alert the court reporter to possible reporting errors in a deposition 
transcript.
201
  Its use is not meant to materially change sworn deposition 
testimony or to add responses that deposing counsel’s questions did not 
elicit.
202
  To illustrate, a deponent’s transcript may reveal a minor “form” 
or typographical defect, such as when the court reporter incorrectly spells 
the name of the city where the deponent lives, or transposes numerals of 
a telephone number.  In instances where the transcription error is minor 
and insignificant, such as the examples just described, these “form” 
corrections do not affect the deponent’s overall testimony as they relate 
to material facts in the case. 
Any significant changes, such as contradictions to the deponent’s 
original testimony, however, pose a curious and legitimate question 
about whether such dramatic changes should be permitted under Federal 
Rule 30(e).  These types of changes are especially problematic for a 
party who has incurred the time and expense necessary to prepare and 
conduct a proper and effective fact-finding deposition, and who expects 
that the deponent’s answers given at the deposition are truthful. 
As a practical matter, it is usually a party who has been deposed by 
the opposing side who is likely to be later dissatisfied with his deposition 
testimony, either because the deponent’s testimony is not as helpful as 
the deponent intended it to be when he gave it at the deposition, or the 
testimony actually harms the deponent’s legal position in the case.  These 
deponents, in particular, may be highly motivated to change their original 
testimony, especially when faced with a summary judgment motion filed 
by the opposing side. 
Just how far a dissatisfied party may go to change prior testimony 
under Federal Rule 30(e) depends on what types of changes a court will 
permit.  The 2010 case of Norelus v. Denny’s Inc.
203
 is an extreme 
example of potential abuse in using the Federal Rule 30(e) process to 
change prior deposition testimony.  In Denny’s Inc., the plaintiff 
submitted a 63-page errata sheet made up of 848 material and 
                                                          
 201.  Errata Sheet, U.S. LEGAL DEFINITIONS, http://definitions.uslegal.com/e/errata-sheet/ (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2016). 
 202.  Id.; but see Norelus v. Denny’s Inc., 628 F.3d 1270, 1302 (11th Cir. 2010) (Tjoflat, J., 
dissenting) (stating that the 63-page errata sheet containing 868 changes to plaintiff’s deposition 
testimony, “was not an errata sheet as contemplated” by the Federal Rules, but rather a “letter” from 
plaintiff’s counsel to defense counsel). 
 203.  Denny’s Inc., 628 F.3d at 1302 (affirming sanctions against plaintiff’s attorneys for abusing 
Federal Rule 30(e)). 
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contradictory changes to her original deposition testimony.
204
  This case, 
like others, demonstrates how Federal Rule 30(e) can be abused.  
Currently, the federal courts are divided between a strict and broad 
approach to Federal Rule 30(e). 
1. The Narrow Interpretation of Federal Rule 30(e)—Followed by 
Tenth Circuit 
Despite the broad and plain language of Federal Rule 30(e), some 
federal courts, including the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, reject 
the notion that Federal Rule 30(e) gives a deponent carte blanche to 
materially change or add to deposition answers in any way that alters or 
contradicts the original deposition testimony without a legitimate 
purpose to do so.
205
  Courts in this group take a restrictive approach in 
applying Federal Rule 30(e), holding that the rule “is to be used for 
corrective, and not contradictory, changes.”
206
 
Notwithstanding the potentially broad and plain language of Federal 
Rule 30(e), the 1992 case of Greenway v. International Paper Co.,
207
 
from the Western District of Louisiana, is probably one of the earliest 
cases that narrowly interprets the rule, and it is this seminal case that is 
commonly cited by federal courts that embrace a strict application of the 
rule.  In Greenway, an employment case, the defendant sought to 
“suppress and nullify” the plaintiff’s attempts to make 64 separate and 
distinct changes to her deposition testimony.
208
  In the opinion, the 
district court contrasted the plaintiff’s deposition answers with the 
plaintiff’s corrections on the errata sheet, all of which significantly 
contradicted plaintiff’s original testimony.
209
  The following examples of 
revised answers made by the plaintiff-deponent in Greenway are just two 
of many changes the court highlighted in its opinion: 
As stated in the deposition: 
“No, sir.” 
                                                          
 204.  Id. 
 205.  Greenway v. Int’l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322 (W.D. La. 1992); Thorn v. Sundstrand 
Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000); Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233 (10th 
Cir. 2002); Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enter., 397 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 206.  Hambleton, 397 F.3d at 1226. 
 207.  Greenway, 144 F.R.D. at 323. 
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. 
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Correction desired [on the errata sheet]: 
“Yes, sir.  For example, after I filed the quick-hour grievance in June 
1990, Jimmy retaliated against me by forbidding me from using the 
telephone while at work, taking any jobs without his permission and 
talking to any management personnel without first talking to 
him . . .”
210
 
In yet another example, the plaintiff gave the following answer in the 
deposition: 
“Well, it had to be over fifteen foot because . . . .” 
Correction desired on the errata sheet: 
“Well, it was approximately eight feet wide because . . . .”
211
 
In rejecting plaintiff’s attempted changes, the Greenway court 
pointed out that in almost all of the 64 changes plaintiff made to her 
original answers, plaintiff’s revised answers were inconsistent with her 
deposition testimony and were not simply making her answers: (1) more 
accurate and complete; or (2) for the purpose of clarification.
212
  The 
court analyzed the plaintiff’s reasons for her changes, and emphasized 
that the “purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious.”
213
  “The Rule cannot be 
interpreted to allow one to alter what was said under oath.  If that were 
the case, [the deponent] could merely answer the questions with no 
thought at all then return home and plan artful responses.  Depositions 
differ from interrogatories in that regard.”
214
  Moreover, the court chided, 
“[a] deposition is not a take home examination.”
215
 
In 2000, in Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp.,
216
 an employment 
case brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 
Seventh Circuit recognized that the plain language of Federal Rule 30(e) 
permits deposition answers to be altered in “form or substance,” but the 
court also cited Greenway for the proposition that it is a “questionable” 
tactic for a deponent to substantively alter his deposition answers after 
                                                          
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. at 324. 
 212.  Id. at 325. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383 (7th Cir. 2000). 
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review of the transcript.
217
  Further, the court determined, “a change of 
substance which actually contradicts the transcript is impermissible 
unless it can plausibly be represented as the correction of an error in 
transcription, such as dropping a ‘not.’”
218
 
The federal courts that prohibit contradictory corrections to 
deposition testimony have done so particularly when a party seeks to 
alter a deponent’s answers in an attempt to defeat a summary judgment 
motion filed by the opposing party.  This was the situation in 2002, when 
the Tenth Circuit decided Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club.
219
  In 
Garcia—also an employment discrimination case—the Tenth Circuit 
reviewed and reversed the district court’s order for summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant.
220
  In arriving at its decision, the court concluded 
that the facts taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, including 
the defendant’s reliance upon testimony “where that errata strayed 
substantively from the original testimony,” properly stated a claim to be 
considered by a jury.
221
  Though noted in a footnote, the court 
commented that the Greenway court best “expressed the purpose and 
scope of Rule 30(e),” which is to prohibit a deponent from changing 
original deposition testimony in such a way that it contradicts what was 
first said under oath by the deponent.
222
  Further, the court stressed, 
“[w]e do not condone . . . material changes to deposition testimony and 
certainly do not approve of the use of such altered testimony that is 
controverted by the original testimony.”
223
 
In 2005, in Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enterprises,
224
 the 
Ninth Circuit, citing both Greenway and Garcia, emphasized that any 
alterations to deposition answers must have a “legitimate purpose.”
225
  
The court invoked the “sham affidavit” doctrine to emphasize that “a 
party cannot create an issue of fact by an affidavit contradicting his prior 
deposition testimony.”
226
  In the case before it, the court went on to 
                                                          
 217.  Id. at 389 (citing Greenway, 144 F.R.D. at 322; Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., 112 
F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 220.  Id. at 1233. 
 221.  Id. at 1242 n.5. 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enter., 397 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 225.  Id. at 1224–25. 
 226.  Id. at 1225; see also Reilly v. TXU Corp., 230 F.R.D. 486 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (analyzing the 
“sham affidavit” doctrine, but choosing to adopt the broad interpretation of Federal Rule 30(e)). 
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critically assess the plaintiff’s seemingly strategic timing in making 
corrections to a deponent’s testimony after the defendant filed a motion 
for summary judgment.
227
  In disallowing the plaintiff’s revised 
deposition testimony, the Ninth Circuit validated the magistrate judge’s 
concern that the deponent’s “‘corrections’ were not corrections at all, but 
rather purposeful rewrites” of deposition testimony “tailored to 
manufacture an issue of material fact . . . and to avoid a summary 
judgment ruling in [defendant’s] favor.”
228
  Of important note, in Burns 
v. Board of County Commissioners, a case that came after Garcia, the 
Tenth Circuit also used the sham affidavit doctrine to evaluate whether a 




2. The Broad Interpretation of Federal Rule 30(e) 
While the Tenth Circuit follows the more restrictive interpretation of 
Federal Rule 30(e), some federal courts rely on the broad and plain 
language of the rule to give deponents wide latitude to change their 
deposition answers.
230
  As early as 1981, in Lugtig v. Thomas,
231
 the 
Northern District of Illinois addressed a plaintiff’s motion objecting to 
the 69 changes defendant-deponent made to his deposition testimony.
232
  
The Lugtig court acknowledged that the deponent’s changes were not 
“form” corrections, but instead “were substantive” in nature.
233
  In 
analyzing deponent’s numerous changes, the court pointed out that in 30 
                                                          
 227.  Hambleton, 397 F.3d at 1225. 
 228.  Id.; see also Combs v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 486, 488–89 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting 
that changes to deposition testimony were central to upcoming summary judgment proceeding, and 
not allowed); Burns v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 330 F.3d 1275, 1281–82 (10th Cir. 2003) (determining 
that plaintiff’s attempts to make changes to deposition testimony must be assessed via the sham 
affidavit doctrine).  
 229. Burns, 330 F.3d at 1281–83. 
 230.  See Podell v. Citicorp Diners Club, 112 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding the district court 
properly considered both amended and original testimony concerning consumer’s receipt of updated 
credit report from agency); see also EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that it is up to the discretion of the district court to allow contradictory changes on an errata 
sheet; however, the court should determine the appropriate remedy for such changes); Reilly, 230 
F.R.D. at 491 (holding that plaintiff was permitted to correct his deposition, even though his changes 
altered his original testimony in substantive and contradictory ways); Eiken v. USAA Fed. Sav. 
Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Tex. 2007) (denying the defendant’s motion to strike the plaintiff’s 
attempts to  change his deposition, because the appropriate remedy for deposition changes is 
impeaching the plaintiff at trial). 
 231.  Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 232.  Id. at 641. 
 233.  Id. 
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of the changes, the deponent retracted his original responses.
234
  In other 
changes, the deponent contradicted “yes” responses given at the 
deposition with “no” responses, and vice versa.
235
  Relying on the plain 
language of Federal Rule 30(e), the court wrote: 
The language of the Rule places no limitations on the type of changes 
that may be made by a witness before signing his deposition. . . .  
Allowing a witness to change his deposition before trial eliminates the 
likelihood of deviations from the original deposition in his testimony at 




The rationale of the Lugtig court appears to depend not only on its 
reliance on the plain language of Federal Rule 30(e) but also on the 




Like Lugtig, other federal courts have expressly relied on the plain 
language of Federal Rule 30(e) to permit a deponent to make any 
changes whatsoever to deposition testimony.
238
  Further, many of these 
courts have determined that changes made on an errata sheet are subject 
only to two requirements under Federal Rule 30(e).  First, under Federal 
Rule 30(e)(1), the deponent is required make any changes within 30 days 
after the transcript is available.
239
  Second, paragraph (e)(1)(B) of the 
rule requires a deponent to provide reasons for any changes made to his 
original testimony.
240
  Beyond these two constraints, any retractions or 
additions to original deposition testimony, including contradictory 
changes, are allowed.
241
  After the deponent completes his or her 
changes, Federal Rule 30(e)(2) requires the court reporter to “attach” the 
errata sheet to the original deposition transcript.
242
 
                                                          
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. (citing Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petrol. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)). 
 237.  See generally Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639 (N.D. Ill. 1981); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
26.   
 238.  See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Serrano, No. 11-2075-JAR, 2012 WL 28071, at *6 (D. Kan. 
Jan. 5, 2012). 
 239.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1).   
 240.  FED. R. CIV. P.  30(e)(1)(B).   
 241.  See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e). 
 242.  FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(2). 
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3. Treatment of Original Deposition Testimony 
In jurisdictions, like the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits, where 
courts are skeptical of, and mostly reject substantive changes or 
corrections to deposition answers, “only those changes which clarify the 
deposition, and not those which materially alter it” are allowed.
243
  
Further, these courts have determined that any changes that contradict 
prior deposition testimony will not be allowed or considered as evidence.  
Significantly, in Greenway, the court took an extreme position when it 
addressed how to handle the numerous substantive and mostly 
contradictory changes made by the deponent.  In ordering all 64 changes 
“deleted,” the Greenway court declared “[t]he deposition . . . will be 
treated as if the plaintiff refused to sign the deposition . . . .”
244
 
As in Greenway, courts must decide how to treat original deposition 
testimony once it has been changed through the Federal Rule 30(e) 
review process.  In Thorn, though the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that 
the language of Federal Rule 30(e) permitted the deponent to make 
substantive changes to his original testimony so that he could clarify 
“what he said to what he meant,” the court cautioned that such a “tactic 
was foolish” because a jury could consider the deponent’s original 
answers alongside the substantive changes made on the errata sheet.
245
  
Referring to Federal Rule 30(e)(2), which requires all changes to be 
appended to the transcript, the court stressed “fortunately the rule 
[Federal Rule 30(e)] requires that the original transcript be retained.”
246
  
Following the same reasoning, but taking a slightly more direct approach 
to addressing contradictory changes made to deposition testimony, in 
Eicken v. USAA Federal Savings Bank,
247
 the District Court for the 
Southern District of Texas determined that “[p]laintiff’s original answers 
will remain part of the record” and “[d]efendants’ ability to use those 




                                                          
 243.  Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added) 
(citing Rios v. Bigler, 847 F. Supp. 1538, 1546–47 (D. Kan. 1994) (allowing changes to deposition 
testimony if the change is made to clarify original testimony, not materially alter it). 
 244.  Greenway v. Int’l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992). 
 245.  Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 246.  Id. 
 247.  Eicken v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 498 F. Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Tex. 2007). 
 248.  Id. at 961. 
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4. Sufficiency of Reasons for Changes on the Errata Sheet 
Federal Rule 30(e)(1)(B) requires the deponent to provide reasons 
for any changes he makes to a deposition transcript.
249
  In Duff v. 
Lobdell-Emery Manufacturing Co.,
250
 the deponent, an employee of the 
defendant who terminated plaintiff’s employment, supplemented his 
deposition testimony but failed to provide any reasons for the changes on 
an errata sheet as required by the rule.
251
  The plaintiff sought to have the 
deponent’s revised answers, along with other evidence, stricken from the 
district court’s consideration of the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.
252
  In granting the plaintiff’s motion to strike, the district court 
acknowledged that while Federal Rule 30(e) allows the deponent to make 
both form and substantive changes to deposition testimony, the rule is 
not “onerous” and “requires a statement of reasons for making them.”
253
 
But even when a deponent puts forth reasons for the changes to 
deposition answers on the errata sheet, not surprisingly, courts differ on 
what they find to be sufficient or adequate reasons for compliance with 
the rule.  In Lugtig v. Thomas, analyzed above, the court did not 
question, and in fact, accepted the deponent’s reasons that “he either did 
not know the answer, did not remember, or did not understand the 
question.”
254
  Federal Rule 30(e) merely requires the deponent to provide 
a reason for the changes, the court reasoned, it does not “require a judge 
to examine the sufficiency, reasonableness, or legitimacy of the reasons 
for the changes.”
255
  Yet in Mata v. Caring for You Home Health, Inc.,
256
 
which involved an employer’s attempt to defeat a plaintiff-employee’s 
summary judgment motion in a case brought under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas 
determined that the defendant-deponents gave “insufficiently vague and 
conclusory reasons,” such as “[t]o clarify the record.”
257
  The Mata court 
interpreted Federal Rule 30(e) to require a deponent to provide more 
                                                          
 249.  See Hambleton Bros. Lumber Co. v. Balkin Enter., 397 F.3d 1217, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(“A statement of reasons explaining corrections is an important component of errata submitted 
pursuant to FRCP 30(e).”). 
 250. Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg. Co., 926 F. Supp. 799 (N.D. Ind. 1996). 
 251.  Id. at 804. 
 252.  Id. at 803. 
 253.  Id. at 804. 
 254.  Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
 255.  Id. 
 256.  Mata v. Caring for You Home Health, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 3d 867 (S.D. Tex. 2015). 
 257.  Id. at 872. 
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explanation about his reasons for changing his testimony in order to be in 
compliance.
258
  It stated that a party “cannot use Rule 30(e) to make 
substantive, contradictory changes to deposition testimony, at least when 
supported only by pro forma, conclusory reasons.”
259
 
5. Kansas State Practice 
Traditionally, the Kansas rules of civil procedure closely follow the 
federal rules, and when any amendments to the federal rules are enacted, 
Kansas usually follows suit on those changes that are relevant to state 
practice.
260
  For the most part, discovery practice in Kansas state courts 
models the federal district court practice, but there are some differences 
unique to Kansas state  deposition practice.  As examples, unlike the 
federal rule, there is no time limit imposed on the length of a deposition, 
nor is there a limit to the number of depositions that a party can take in a 
given case under Kansas law.
261
  Importantly, the Kansas deposition rule, 
section 60-230(e), is like its counterpart, Federal Rule 30(e), because it 
permits a deponent to make changes to both the “form or substance” of 
the deponent’s testimony.
262
  Further, the Kansas rule imposes the same 
time limit as the federal rule, 30 days, for the deponent to make any 
changes on an errata sheet, and the state rule also requires that all 
changes be appended to the original transcript.
263
  Beyond these specific 
examples, like its federal rule counterpart, the Kansas rule is silent about 




Unlike the controversy played out in the federal practice related to 
scope of changes that are allowed to be made to deposition testimony, 
the Kansas appellate courts have never determined the “breadth of 
changes” that are allowed by section 60-230(e).
265
  Presumably, should 
the issue arise in state practice, the Tenth Circuit’s restrictive 
interpretation espoused in the Garcia and Burns cases would likely carry 
                                                          
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Id. 
 260.  See J. Nick Badgerow, The Fork in the Road: A Practitioner’s Guide to the 1997 Changes 
in the Code of Civil Procedure, 66 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 32 (1997).  
 261.  See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-230 (Supp. 2015). 
 262.  See generally id. § 60-230(e). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Id. 
 265.  David A. Wollin & Geoffrey W. Millsom, Everything You Always Wanted To Know About 
Depositions: But Your Client Could Not Afford To Research, 50-JUN. R.I. B.J. 5, 37 (2002). 
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significant weight, though it is anyone’s guess whether the state appellate 
court would follow the narrow approach when interpreting the state rule. 
F. Sanctions and Ethical Implications for Lawyers Practicing in Kansas 
Federal Rule 37 provides a court with a wide range of remedies to 
address all forms of discovery abuse.  Related to depositions, the court 
may order sanctions if a person designated for a deposition “fails, after 
being served with proper notice, to appear.”
266
  The court may also order 
sanctions if: (1) a deponent fails to answer a question under Federal Rule 
30; or (2) if the deponent provides an evasive or incomplete answer.
267
  
The Kansas state procedural rule, section 60-237, emulates much of what 
Federal Rule 37 entails, though it is not as explicit or specific in its 
language.
268
  While most discovery disputes are often addressed directly 
in the case at hand should a court consider a Rule 37 motion, the lawyer 
also could be held ethically responsible under the Kansas Rules of 
Professional Conduct (KRPC) for any inappropriate conduct that occurs 
in a deposition setting.
269
  The myriad of rules in Kansas that are 
triggered for a lawyer’s unethical conduct in deposition practice include: 
(1) 3.1—Meritorious Claims and Contentions; (2) 3.2—Expediting 
Litigation; (3) 3.3—Candor Toward the Tribunal; (4) 3.4—Fairness to 
Opposing Party and Counsel; and (5) 8.4(d)—Misconduct.
270
 
As a general matter, under KRPC 1.2, regarding Scope of 
Representation, the lawyer, in consultation with the client, is responsible 
for making purely tactical decisions regarding a client’s representation.
271
  
Comment 1, in relevant part, states that “[a] lawyer is not required to 
pursue objections or employ means simply because a client may wish 
that the lawyer do so.”
272
 This comment further states: “[i]n questions of 
means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical and legal 
issues.”
273
  As we have seen in this Article, it is usually the obstructionist 
tactics, rude or boorish behavior, or other improper conduct of the lawyer 
that results in discovery disputes and sanctions, all of which may be 
                                                          
 266.  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i). 
 267.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)–(4). 
 268.  See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-237 (Supp. 2015). 
 269.  See generally KAN. R.  PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3. 
 270.  Id. at 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 8.5(d). 
 271.  Id. at 1.2. 
 272.  Id. at 1.2, cmt. 1. 
 273.  Id. at 1.2, cmt. 1. 
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deemed “prejudicial to the administration of justice” under KRPC 8.4(d), 




1. Meritorious Claims and Contentions and Expediting Litigation 
KRPC 3.1—Meritorious Claims and Contentions—provides that: 
“[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert 
an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous.”
275
  Comment 1 of this rule provides that the “advocate has a 
duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, 
but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure.  The law, both procedural 
and substantive, establishes the limits within which an advocate may 
proceed.”
276
  A related rule in the deposition context, 3.2—Expediting 
Litigation, expects that the lawyer “shall make reasonable efforts to 
expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”
277
  The 
rule’s sole comment is illustrative in that it recognizes “[d]ilatory 
practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute.”
278
  Further, it 
warns that “[d]elay should not be indulged . . . for the purpose of 




Thus, the reading of both KRPC 3.1 and 3.2 suggests that gratuitous 
interruptions, disruptive behavior, or even improper speaking objections 
made by counsel during the deposition will invariably frustrate the 
discovery process and the right of a deposing attorney to gather 
information from an adverse party through an unobstructed question and 




2. Candor Toward the Tribunal 
Under KRPC 3.3, as it relates to deposition practice, a lawyer has 
two affirmative duties of candor toward the tribunal.  First, under 
                                                          
 274.  Id. at 8.4(d). 
 275.  Id. at 3.1. 
 276.  Id. at 3.1, cmt. 1. 
 277.  Id. at 3.2. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id.  
 280.  MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 2, at 25–28. 
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paragraph (a)(1), “a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement 
of fact . . . to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact 
. . . previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”
281
  Importantly, 
comment 1 to this rule applies to a lawyer’s conduct in an ancillary 
proceeding, such as a deposition.
282
  Second, paragraph (a)(3) of the rule 
requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer 




Certainly, if a lawyer comes to know that his client is falsely 
testifying at a deposition, the lawyer must take remedial measures to 
correct the falsity at the deposition, if possible.  Significantly, it is the 
deposition transcript review process that presents an opportunity for the 
lawyer to improperly influence the deponent regarding changes to 
original testimony.  But no matter how unhelpful or damaging the 
deponent’s testimony may be at the deposition or on the transcript, it is 
ethically impermissible for a lawyer to counsel a deponent to change 
testimony with the strategy and intention to provide false evidence in 
order to subvert important legal process. 
3. Conferencing at a Deposition 
The 2013 Kansas disciplinary case of In re Druten,
284
 discussed more 
fully below, suggests that it may necessary for an attorney to confer with 
his client in order to clarify testimony, or a misrepresentation of prior 
deposition testimony, so that any falsity that results from the deponent’s 
testimony is corrected as soon as is practicable.
285
  Though the court in 
Druten focused on the attorney’s misconduct as it related to violation of 
KRPC 3.4—Fairness Toward Opposing Party and Counsel—this case 
also makes the point that appropriate conferencing between a lawyer and 
client, within the parameter of the procedural rules, may prevent or serve 




                                                          
 281.  KAN. R.  PROF’L CONDUCT 3.3. 
 282.  Id. at 3.3, cmt. 1. 
 283.  Id. at 3.3. 
 284.  In re Druten, 301 P.3d 319 (Kan. 2013). 
 285.  See generally id. 
 286.  See id. at 328. 
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4. Ethical Implications for Altering Deponent’s Testimony 
Because of the broad language of both the federal and state 
deposition rules and the controversy in the federal system regarding 
altered testimony when there is apparent abuse in making such changes, 
there is also an obvious ethical concern about the lawyer’s role in the 
transcript review process.  A prime example showing a lawyer’s 
inappropriate conduct in submitting a false errata sheet is the case of 
Combs v. Rockwell International Corp.
287
  In Combs, the plaintiff-
deponent was apparently satisfied with most of his deposition testimony, 
but he gave his lawyer authorization to make substantive and 
contradictory revisions to his deposition testimony without his review.
288
  
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the lawsuit as 
a sanction for the lawyer and his client “falsifying evidence” on the 
errata sheet.
289
  While the lawyer’s misconduct in Combs was 
appropriately addressed directly by the court in the case itself, and with 
harsh consequences for the client, lawyers should consider the ethical 
implications for engaging in such conduct. 
Presumably, federal courts like the Tenth Circuit and others, which 
use the narrow interpretation of Federal Rule 30(e), will be inherently 
suspicious about the deponent’s motives for making substantive changes, 
especially if the changes are contradictory in nature.  Probably even more 
concerning to courts, and even to litigants, is when a deponent makes 
substantive and contradictory changes that coincide with a summary 
judgment motion.  Invariably, a deponent’s decision to materially change 
or contradict his original deposition testimony triggers the question about 
the lawyer’s role in the client’s decision to do so.  In Kansas, a lawyer 
could potentially violate KRCP 3.3 if he has improperly advised, 
encouraged, or influenced the deponent in any way to make substantive 
and even contradictory changes that could be viewed as “falsifying 
evidence.” 
5. Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel 
In addition to being truthful in a deposition, the Kansas ethical rules 
also require the lawyer to be fair and honest with the opposing party.  
KRPC 3.4(b) provides in relevant part: “[a] lawyer shall not . . . falsify 
                                                          
 287.  Combs v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 927 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 288.  Id. at 488. 
 289.  Id. 
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evidence, [or] counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely.”
290
  Comment 
1 provides that the rule is meant to ensure that the “evidence in a case 
[is] marshalled competitively by the contending parties.  Fair competition 
in the adversary system is secured by prohibitions against destruction or 
concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses, [and] 
obstructive tactics in discovery procedure.”
291
  KRPC 3.4 not only 
requires a lawyer to be honest with opposing counsel, but it also 
mandates that the lawyer not engage in any tactics that would obstruct 
discovery procedure.
292
  Thus, like KRPC 3.3, if a lawyer counsels a 
client to add or change original testimony in any way that is deemed 
dishonest or obstructive and which affects the opposing party in any 
detrimental way, the lawyer could be subject to discipline.  Additionally, 




As mentioned above, in Druten, the Kansas Supreme Court 
addressed an attorney’s ethical misconduct within the context of KRPC 
3.4.
294
  The Court concluded that the lawyer, Mr. Druten, violated 
numerous ethical rules, including specifically KRPC 3.4(b), when he 
assisted his client in testifying falsely at a deposition.
295
  The conduct at 
issue began when Mr. Druten’s client, Mr. Jeffries, who was being 
deposed, requested a break after the deposing lawyer asked him a 
question that he was uncomfortable answering.
296
  Had Mr. Jeffries 
answered truthfully at the time the question was asked, the answer would 
have been harmful to his case.
297
  During the break in which the lawyer 
and client conferred, Mr. Druten intimated to his client that it was 
acceptable to lie, by saying: “[w]ell you’re going to say what you want to 
say, so go ahead.”
298
  Later, in Mr. Druten’s disciplinary proceeding, Mr. 
Jeffries was asked whether Mr. Druten advised him at any time to correct 
the false statement that he gave at the deposition.
299
  Mr. Jeffries 
                                                          
 290.  KAN. R. PROF’L CONDUCT 3.4. 
 291.  Id. at 3.4, cmt. 1 (emphasis added). 
 292.  Id. at 3.4. 
    293.  See supra Part II.B.1. (providng case analysis where incivility during a deposition was 
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  Thus, Mr. Druten’s conduct in not correcting and even 
encouraging false testimony at the deposition was deemed unethical, and 
Mr. Druten was appropriately disciplined. 
Finally, KRPC 8.4(d): Maintaining the Integrity of the Profession: 
Misconduct, provides that it is misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
301
  This wide-
sweeping ethics rule looks at a lawyer’s inappropriate conduct broadly 
and focuses on whether the lawyer’s misconduct in a deposition has 
affected legal process as a whole.
302
  Comment 1 to this rule is insightful 
because it aptly explains that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to 





The proper object of any deposition is “to obtain and record the 
clear, truthful answers of the witness to questions which address matters 
within the scope of discovery.”
304
  This objective may be rendered 
merely aspirational when lawyers engage in vexatious scheduling tactics, 
boorish or rude behavior in the deposition, on and off-the-record witness 
coaching, or improper alterations of testimony by means of the errata 
sheet.  Zealous advocacy may once have “served as the mantra for 
excellence,” evoking the “image of a crusader for justice.”
305
  Today, 
however, a warped sense of zealous representation has made many 
depositions a display of gamesmanship accepted as the “routine 
chicanery of federal [and state] discovery practice.”
306
  Due diligence is 
not de facto one-upsmanship via obstructionist deposition ploys.  Rather, 
it is furthering the client’s purpose through legal and ethical means.
307
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The trend of this conduct in civil litigation has reached its crescendo.
308
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